What Trump Should Push Bibi on at Mar-a-Lago

Another possible conflict with Iran and Phase 2 of the Gaza Peace Plan will be the main items on the agenda.

On Monday, President Trump will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago. What does Trump need to get out of this moment – and what should we realistically expect from this meeting?

In the run-up to the meeting, implementing the Gaza peace plan was clearly issue number one on the agenda for Trump. In recent days, disturbingly but unsurprisingly, we have started to see reporting that Netanyahu will lobby Trump to conduct more strikes on Iran.

Let’s take a look at what Trump and his advisors should try to accomplish in this meeting and in the flurry of diplomatic activity that is likely to surround it. I’ll be honest that I doubt they can actually pull this off, or that they’ll even pursue the strategies I’m recommending, but this is what I would advise them to do.

Another Iran Conflict? Absolutely Not

For those of us who were deeply skeptical of the so-called 12-day war in June, it’s hardly surprising that – just six months after Israel and the United States supposedly “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program – reports are already emerging that Benjamin Netanyahu plans to present new Iran war options to Donald Trump.

This is the core flaw in the Trump–Netanyahu approach to Iran. By launching a preventive war with no clear endgame, they blew up any realistic path to diplomacy – only to discover what was always obvious: Iran’s nuclear program was set back, not permanently destroyed. Permanent destruction was never a realistic outcome. And so here we are again, exactly where many of us warned we would be – locked into a cycle of recurring instability and periodic wars between Israel and Iran.

That cycle is a disaster for all parties. It’s a disaster for the Israeli public if every six to twelve months the country is forced into one- or two-week stretches of life in bomb shelters. It’s a disaster for the Gulf states, who see missiles flying over their airspace – or, worse yet, hitting U.S. bases within their borders – as profoundly destabilizing and directly undermining their central goal of economic diversification beyond oil. It’s a disaster for both the Iranian regime and its civilian population, who sustained major losses during the last war. And it’s a major strategic distraction for the United States, which risks being repeatedly dragged into conflicts that do nothing to advance its long-term interests.

A deal that puts verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for some levels of sanctions relief was the best option in 2015 when President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It was the best option in 2018 when Trump walked away from the deal. And it was the best option last spring when Trump allowed Netanyahu to spike negotiations and go to war. It remains the best option today.

Hopefully, Trump shuts down Netanyahu’s talk of war – and there are reasons to think he might. Having declared Iran’s nuclear program permanently destroyed just six months ago, another war would be deeply embarrassing. He may prefer to keep polishing his Nobel Peace Prize narrative by focusing on progress in Gaza.

But Netanyahu has persuaded Trump to strike Iran once before. There’s no guarantee he won’t succeed again.

Pushing for Phase 2 on Gaza

When it comes to Gaza, before we can even talk about Phase 2, it’s important to remember that the U.S. still needs to push harder on humanitarian aid. Conditions in Gaza are better than during the war – but aid flows remain inadequate. Commercial goods are getting in because they make people money, but humanitarian aid is subject to much tougher restrictions. That double standard must stop, and the U.S. must pressure Israel to end this practice.

As for the peace plan, neither the Netanyahu government nor Hamas really want to move to Phase 2 of the agreement, when doing so would ultimately result in Hamas being replaced and disarmed, and in Israel withdrawing from Gaza.

Netanyahu is relatively comfortable controlling roughly half of Gaza. Hamas has reasserted its control in the other half. Civilians are trapped in between, in better conditions than those they endured during the war, but still in misery and with little hope of improvement. Netanyahu can avoid taking steps that could eventually lead to a Palestinian alternative to Hamas controlling Gaza – a development he is extremely eager to avoid, as it could ultimately lead to reunification between Gaza and the West Bank and a pathway to a Palestinian state. Hamas does not have to take steps that would ultimately lead to its own displacement or even disarmament.

Everyone says they agreed to the 20-point plan. But in reality, neither side wants to implement the parts that would move the region onto a meaningfully different long-term path.

That’s exactly why moments like this meeting matter. Trump still has tremendous leverage over Netanyahu because of his popularity with Netanyahu’s voting base. And he has significant leverage with Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt, who do not want to anger an unpredictable American President. They, in turn, have significant leverage over Hamas. So if Trump and his team want to make progress on Phase 2, they are going to need to use this moment to apply a lot of pressure on all of the parties, as they did to reach the initial ceasefire.

What Trump Needs From Israel

As I’ve written about previously, everything begins with the international stabilization force. It is the linchpin of the entire strategy. Without it, nothing else works. But to make that force viable, Trump needs several critical commitments from Israel.

1. Acceptance that the ISF works through Palestinians – especially the Palestinian Authority

The international force is not going to fight Hamas on the front lines or in tunnels. It will operate by supporting, training, and standing behind local Palestinian security forces.

In the real world, that means the Palestinian Authority has to play a central role. Netanyahu has spent years trying to sideline the PA, because empowering it raises the specter of Gaza–West Bank reunification and a pathway to a two-state outcome. Instead, Israel has experimented with alternatives – gangs, local militias, anyone but the PA. It hasn’t worked. It’s been chaotic and, frankly, absurd.

Yes, the PA has its shortcomings. But it is the only Palestinian entity with existing legitimacy, institutional depth, and real security forces. And without a PA role, Arab states will not participate. Period.

So far, the Trump team has been accommodating of Netanyahu’s objections to PA participation. That needs to change. An Israeli commitment to allow PA security forces to work with the international stabilization force may be the single hardest and important thing Trump needs to extract from Netanyahu. Without it, Hamas will continue to control Gaza and Phase 2 will go nowhere.

2. A realistic approach to Hamas disarmament

Israel also needs to accept reality on disarmament. Full, upfront Hamas disarmament is not realistic. It never has been. Disarmament is a phased process that happens over years as Hamas is replaced by alternative governing and security structures and steadily weakened.

That doesn’t mean there are no immediately achievable steps that can be taken upfront – but it does mean abandoning the fantasy of immediate, total surrender. If Israel insists on that fantasy, Phase 2 will die before it begins.

3. A real path for IDF withdrawal

Israel must agree that once an international force deploys into Israeli-controlled areas of Gaza, this will quickly lead to IDF redeployments.

Without that commitment, no serious country will participate. No one wants to be seen as enabling a permanent Israeli occupation of Gaza under another name.

4. Openness to Turkish participation in the ISF

This one is more of a “nice to have” than a must – but it matters. Turkey is one of the few countries that has both military capacity and an expressed willingness to deploy forces to Gaza. There is deep Israeli distrust of Turkey – understandably – but the list of alternatives is thin. Egypt will have to be part of it, but doesn’t want to be seen as going in on its own. Indonesia, Italy, and other European and Asian states have been discussed, but don’t have on-the-ground knowledge or relationships.

Turkey knows Gaza and its military has real capability. It also has a strong relationship with Hamas, giving it both leverage and credibility with the organization. This could prove invaluable in getting Hamas to accept the force and taking extra steps to avoid firing at it. Trump has a strong relationship with Erdogan. If Turkey is in the force, he’ll be able to lean on Erdogan, who will lean on Hamas. So, if Trump can get Netanyahu to accept a Turkish role, it could significantly strengthen the force.

What Trump Needs From Hamas – Via Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey

To keep moving Phase 2 along, Trump and his advisors will also need to get concessions directly from Hamas. Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey will have to do the heavy lifting. They need to press Hamas as hard as they did during the culmination of the ceasefire negotiations – putting it in a corner where it sees no better option than agreeing.

1. A commitment not to attack the international force or Palestinian security forces

This is basic, but essential. Hamas must agree to accept and not to fire on the international stabilization force and not to attack Palestinian police or security units supported by that force. Without this guarantee, no one will deploy.

Why would Hamas agree to this? Hamas is weak. It believes it can survive by relinquishing some power, going underground, and trying to remain the primary power broker in Gaza by leveraging what remains of its political clout and any small arms it can hold onto. But our gamble has to be that if the plan works and the ISF and supported Palestinian forces are able to deploy and work with a transitional Palestinian technocratic government entity, then over time Hamas will keep getting weaker and more marginalized. Eventually, it will have to give up its remaining arms.

2. Initial, visible steps toward disarmament

While Israeli insistence on full disarmament is a poison pill, Hamas needs to agree to some credible early steps on decommissioning its arms. That could include giving up heavy weapons – rockets and anti-tank systems – or placing certain arms under the custody of the ISF. These steps would signal that Hamas is actually living up to its commitments and create political space for the Israeli government to keep moving on its commitments by demonstrating that this plan could credibly lead to the complete defeat and disarmament of Hamas.

What Trump Needs From the Arab States

Beyond pressuring Hamas, the U.S. also needs the Arab states themselves to step up.

1. Real participation in the international force

This is the hardest piece in terms of international support. So far, there is little enthusiasm from the Arab and Muslim states to insert forces into Gaza. None are willing to do this alone, and mostly don’t want the ISF to be seen as a nominally “Arab” force doing Israel’s bidding. But it’s also true that this cannot work without at least Egyptian and possibly Turkish participation, since these are countries that actually know Gaza and understand its inner workings better than any other country. With their participation, you can get support from others, including Indonesia, Pakistan, and potentially European states like Italy or the UK.

Understandably, none of these countries want to go in if there isn’t a clear mandate and set of missions. I would argue for three central roles: a) support the local Palestinian security forces and police force that is set up to provide security on the ground in Gaza; b) reduce friction along the “yellow line” so that we stop having incidents where Palestinian civilians accidentally cross the line and the IDF responds with lethal force; and c) provide a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian aid. Importantly, the mission is not to directly fight it out with Hamas. No one would agree to do that.

2. Unity behind the Palestinian transitional entity

There is reportedly agreement amongst the PA, Hamas, Israel, and Egypt on a potential list of Palestinian technocrats who would temporarily govern Gaza. However, not all of the Arab states are in agreement on the potential names, and given that the Arab states will play a central role not just in providing troops but also in helping finance parts of the reconstruction of Gaza, sign off and agreement by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE on the Palestinian transitional governing entity for Gaza is important.

The UAE, in particular, has taken a hard line on the composition of the governance entity, driven by deep hostility and skepticism toward President Abbas (at least partially driven by advice they get from Abbas’ chief rival, Mohammed Dahlan, who is close to the Emirati leadership). At some point, the U.S. has to put its foot down and insist that this infighting has to stop. Reform the PA, yes – but don’t hold the entire process hostage.

3. Buy-in to the Board of Peace

Honestly, I still don’t understand the need for this high-level Board of Peace run by Trump. You don’t need a group of world leaders presiding over the future of Gaza, and the concept reeks of colonialism. But if this keeps Trump and the U.S. deeply engaged and therefore leads to progress, I support it. In the immediate term, Trump needs to nail down the participation of Arab leaders in this board and announce it.

The Bottom Line

None of this is easy, and of course I’m skeptical that any of it is possible. It doesn’t help that the U.S. policy apparatus is incredibly thin – largely centered around Witkoff, Kushner, and a small team that lacks the institutional depth this type of massive effort requires.

It’s even harder with an Israeli government that resists every step. Hopefully, with elections next year in Israel, that could change. And, obviously, negotiating with Hamas is no easy task either.

Still, the alternative is accepting a divided Gaza, frozen in a miserable status quo, until the next war erupts. And so we have no choice but to hope and encourage Trump to use this meeting as a moment of leverage to try to move things in the right direction.

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