What to Make of Trump’s New Peace Plan

He Needs to Hold Everyone’s Feet to the Fire to Bring it to Fruition

With President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu meeting today at the White House, and a peace plan on the table, where do we stand? My bottom line is that this appears to be a promising proposal. It includes both an immediate end to the war and a framework for the day after, something many of us have been arguing for nearly two years.

That said, many pitfalls remain. The most important thing now is that the Trump administration not fall into the trap of trying to negotiate all the details of every element. That could take months, all while the war drags on. Instead, the U.S. should press for an immediate agreement: an end to the war in exchange for the hostages, a surge of aid into Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners along with a general framework for Gaza’s future. The details of the post-conflict plan can then be negotiated once the guns are silent.

Immediate Ceasefire Elements

First, the immediate ceasefire provisions. These are the pieces that need to be worked out in detail before any agreement can begin:

• Immediate End to the War in Exchange for Hostages: All hostages released within 48 hours. No more drawn-out, staged processes releasing ten hostages today and ten more in six weeks for repeated ceasefires. Bring them home now and end the war.
  

• Humanitarian Aid Surge: Aid to return to levels seen during the last ceasefire—about 600 trucks per day—the most since the war began nearly two years ago.
  
  

• Prisoner Release: Palestinian prisoners released in exchange for the hostages.

Post-Conflict Gaza Framework

Second, there are the more complicated provisions for post-war Gaza. These are key, but they will take months to hammer out. The priority should be to get an agreement in principle now, with implementation worked out later:

• Hamas Amnesty or Safe Passage: Hamas fighters could be granted amnesty if they renounce violence or offered safe passage to another country if they refuse. This is a new element. It seems reasonable in that it offers fighters multiple exits while also allowing Israel to declare victory. But the question is: who will take them? Perhaps Turkey or Qatar.
  
  

• Transitional Governance: A technocratic authority with no Hamas involvement, limited Palestinian Authority (PA) participation, and eventual greater PA involvement if reforms are implemented. This is consistent with the NY Declaration supported by France, Saudi Arabia and much of the world and is also consistent with what was put forward by Secretary Blinken at the end of the Biden Administration .
  
  

• No Forced Displacement: Civilians remain in Gaza with the right to return if they leave. This reverses the damaging “Trump Riviera” plan that appealed to the Israeli far right’s fantasies over the past six months.
  
  

• Arab-Led Stabilization Force: A temporary multinational force, including Palestinian police, tasked with security Gaza and helping disarm Hamas and ultimately transitioning authority to a Palestinian police force. This concept—that many of us have argued for since late 2023—remains the only realistic alternative to indefinite Israeli occupation.
  
  

• PA Reform and Deradicalization: An emphasis on PA reform, combined with deradicalization programs in Gaza (a Ron Dermer priority). If implemented, these could set the stage for eventual PA governance of Gaza and even long-term Israeli–Palestinian peace talks.

Unresolved Risks and Pitfalls

Despite these promising elements, there are still major uncertainties:

• The Risk of Dragged-Out Negotiations: The biggest danger is that both Israel and Hamas say “yes” in principle, but then insist on negotiating every detail—from demilitarization to governance—dragging things out for months while the war continues. Why? Because neither side truly wants to say “yes,” but neither wants to be blamed by Trump or the international community for saying “no.” This is exactly what happened with Biden’s May 2024 ceasefire proposal, which both sides nominally accepted, but which did not come to fruition until January 2025. The best way to avoid this is to frontload the agreement: hostages released, war ended, aid surged, and prisoners exchanged immediately—then negotiate the details of the rest later. For this to work, Trump will have to apply major pressure on Netanyahu and on the Arab states whom will then have to press Hamas to prevent this from dragging out.
  
  

• Has Hamas Even Seen the Proposal? Reports suggest Hamas may not have seen the full text yet. Historically, U.S. peace efforts have sometimes shown drafts to Israel first, allowing for edits that later made them unacceptable to Palestinians. By the time the plan reached them, “poison pills” were inserted, and they were blamed for rejecting it. The most significant risk in this plan is that the Israeli withdrawal schedule is unclear and that could lead Hamas to reject it if they do not believe there is a clear guarantee for the Israeli presence in Gaza to end. The good news here is that Trump reportedly consulted Arab states first, and the plan seems to meet their key criteria. Hopefully Hamas has already been briefed on the central elements.
  
  

• Smotrich and Coalition Politics: Netanyahu has prolonged the war in part to maintain his coalition. Itamar Ben Gvir will almost certainly reject the plan and walk. Netanyahu can live with that—but Bezalel Smotrich is pivotal. Smotrich has said he will only accept a deal that excludes the PA entirely from Gaza, as any PA role raises the prospect of Gaza–West Bank reunification and a pathway to Palestinian statehood. But Arab states have made clear that some PA role is essential, since they will not assume responsibility for Gaza indefinitely with no handoff mechanism. Netanyahu could try to placate Smotrich by pushing for West Bank annexation, but Arab states have already said that’s a red line, and even Trump has opposed it (Though noticeably he did not mention opposition to annexation today during the press conference). So will Smotrich fold to avoid elections that might push him out of the Knesset? Or will Netanyahu finally choose to risk elections, and accept Trump’s plan? To date, he has refused that path.
  
  

• Will Arab States Commit to an International Force? There are reports Hamas is asking that international forces only monitor Gaza’s borders, not enter the Strip. Some Arab states may accept this, but that would be a fatal flaw. In that scenario, Hamas could give up governance but retain control of security—cementing its power. Realistically, Hamas will not disarm on day one, and Arab states will not fight them directly. But the whole point is to establish new governing and security institutions that can compete with Hamas for legitimacy while Hamas is weak and unpopular. That cannot happen if the international force won’t even set foot inside Gaza.
  
  

• Israel’s “Freedom of Action” Demands: Israel insists it must retain “freedom of action” in Gaza. In practice, it already has this, just as it does in Syria and Lebanon despite ceasefires. It will act when necessary regardless. Pushing this as a formal clause only risks deadlock, since neither Hamas, the PA, nor Arab states will accept it.
  
  

• The Limits of This Israeli Government: Let’s be clear: the most ambitious aspects of this plan with regards to post-conflict Gaza will never be implemented by a Netanyahu government that includes Smotrich and Ben Gvir. That’s fine for now. The immediate priority is ending the war. Negotiations on the details of a broader framework will likely stall until Israeli elections, when the country may (or may not) elect a government more willing to take the necessary steps that could implement this plan and put Israel on a path to a broad comprehensive regional peace - what we at J Street call the 23 state solution.