The End of “Managing the Conflict”

With the War Over, Israel Faces a Choice – Super Sparta or the 23-State Solution

The war in Gaza is ending, and the ceasefire seems likely to hold. The relief is palpable, but so is the uncertainty. As Israelis and Palestinians navigate the fragile aftermath, the easy wisdom in policy circles is that nothing will fundamentally change beyond ending the fighting. The rest of Donald Trump’s twenty-point plan, skeptics say, is dead on arrival.

It’s tempting to agree. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already spurned an extraordinary opportunity – choosing not to attend a regional summit in Egypt where he could have stood with Arab leaders ready to discuss what comes next. Netanyahu’s domestic politics and aversion to sharing a stage with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, combined with some posturing from Turkish President Erdoğan, all played their part. Meanwhile, Hamas has dragged its feet on returning hostages’ remains, and Israel has responded by threatening to withhold humanitarian aid. Hamas is already reasserting itself in Gaza with reports of fighting on the streets. On the surface, the same cycle of recrimination, punishment and stasis seems to be resuming.

Yet look a layer deeper and it becomes clear that the ground has shifted in ways that can’t easily be undone. “Managing the conflict” as a paradigm is discredited. Israel is increasingly isolated internationally, but also much stronger militarily. The Arab states and the United States are likely to be much more mobilized going forward in addressing and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel now faces a choice. It can double down on occupation and an increasingly militarized approach to the Palestinians that leaves Israel internationally isolated – a path Netanyahu recently described as a “super Sparta.” The alternative is to use this moment to begin building a pathway towards a different future that we at J Street call the 23-state solution.

The End of “Managing the Conflict”

Since the Second Intifada, Israel’s de facto strategy has been to “manage” the conflict – contain Palestinian aspirations rather than resolve them and bet that technological innovation and economic growth could carry Israel forward even as just miles away Palestinians lived in a very different world that the average Israeli didn’t have to worry about or ever see.

The idea was that there was no credible Palestinian partner, so Israel should simply keep things quiet and stable. In practice, that meant weakening moderates and rewarding extremists so that Gaza and the West Bank would remain divided. For years, Netanyahu’s governments starved the Palestinian Authority of funds while allowing Qatari cash to flow directly into Gaza, where Hamas used that cash to consolidate control and was paid off to keep quiet. For years, it seemed to “work” – until it exploded.

October 7 exposed the illusion that conflict management could replace conflict resolution. It proved that indefinite occupation and blockade do not produce security, only recurring catastrophe. And it left the Israeli public asking what comes next.

Growing International Pressure

Another major shift has been the collapse of Israel’s international standing. Even if the mass protests subside and some of the more extreme measures that were being contemplated against Israel, such as banning it from Eurovision or the European soccer league, are put on hold, the reputational damage of the war in Gaza will last. The European Union – Israel’s largest trading partner – has begun taking real economic measures, and some of those may not go away. Legal proceedings at the International Criminal Court, where both Netanyahu and Gallant have been charged with war crimes, are unlikely to disappear. Once foreign journalists regain access to Gaza, the images they bring back may further fuel a reckoning. Israelis may still enjoy vacations in Paris or ski trips in Switzerland, but they will do so as citizens of a pariah state.

A New Regional Balance

Perhaps the most positive development since October 7 has been the geopolitical shift in the balance of power between Israel and Iran. The turning point came in the fall of 2024, when Israel’s war with Hezbollah went far better than expected – dramatically weakening Hezbollah’s military capabilities while avoiding the heavy damage most experts, including Israel’s own leaders, had anticipated. That success set the stage for the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the emergence of a more constructive government in Lebanon. The conflict this past June also underscored Israel’s clear military superiority over Iran, though the extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear program – and whether striking it was strategically wise – remains open to debate.

These developments could tempt Israel to double down on a military-first strategy. Yet they also create an opening: With Iran’s capabilities diminished, Israel can afford to take more risks in pursuing progress with the Palestinians, backed by the confidence that it remains militarily dominant over its greatest state adversary.

A Changed Arab World

Before October 7, the Gulf states had largely moved on from the Palestinian question. The Abraham Accords had normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia was deep in discussions with Washington about joining that normalization track. The Palestinians were an afterthought – useful for symbolic gestures but not a priority.

That has fundamentally changed. The images from Gaza reverberated across the Arab world, especially among the youth. Leaders who had sought to bracket the issue could no longer ignore the outrage of their own citizens. The instability that the fighting fueled in Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Yemen had direct implications on the entire region and endangered the Gulf States’ focus on their most important project – transforming their economies and weaning themselves off of resource dependence. The war forced them to reengage.

Today, Arab states are putting tangible offers on the table: Reconstruction aid for Gaza, participation in a post-war stabilization force and even renewed talk of recognition for Israel – if, and only if, it takes real steps toward a Palestinian state. This is not the window dressing of the past; it reflects genuine strategic recalibration. If Israel wants true regional integration, it cannot bypass the Palestinians. That fantasy is over.

America’s Reassessment

Washington, too, is changing. Public opinion in the United States has shifted dramatically since October 7. Polls show declining support for Israel among Democrats, independents and younger voters – including American Jews. The bipartisan consensus of giving Israel a blank check that once underpinned US policy has fractured. It is not coming back.

Even Donald Trump, whose instincts remain to embrace Netanyahu, ultimately felt compelled to pressure Bibi publicly to change course in order to secure the ceasefire. Twenty-seven US senators – an unimaginable number a few years ago – voted against an arms sale to Israel. On the right, figures such as Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene now question the US-Israel relationship itself.

The Choice for Israel: Super Sparta or the 23-State Solution

None of this means a dramatic transformation will happen overnight. In the near term, Israel’s extremist government is likely to tread water, focused on coalition survival rather than strategic vision. Netanyahu’s instincts – status quo, deflection, delay – are deeply ingrained. He will resist any move that smacks of a big step. That means progress will be painfully slow if it occurs at all.

But elections are coming to Israel in 2026 and represent a potential key pivot moment. Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s alternative will be to double down and move from “managing the conflict” to the “super Sparta” model – fortress Israel, hyper-militarized, secure but morally adrift and internationally isolated. This is the path of deepening occupation, permanent control of the West Bank, indefinite misery in Gaza and a society defined more by fear than by vision.

But Israelis will have an alternative. The public can hold Netanyahu accountable for the failures of October 7. A new government – centrist or center-right, composed of figures like Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman, Yair Lapid, Gadi Eisenkot and Yair Golan – could seize the chance to turn the page and, given the new post-October 7th and Gaza war world, offer a new pathway. It wouldn’t need to immediately embrace the full vision of peace, only to recognize that continuing to fund Palestinian extremists while undermining moderates is self-defeating. It could take a longer view of security, working to reduce Israel’s growing international isolation, strengthen ties with its Arab neighbors and preserve its special relationship with the United States.

Working with Palestinian counterparts, the United States, the Arab World and the international community, a new Israeli government can begin implementing the vision of Trump’s twenty-point plan – a vision that many of us including in the Biden Administration and at J Street have long argued for: International coordination for Gaza’s reconstruction, a multinational stabilization force, empowerment of reformed Palestinian leadership, an end to extreme settlement growth and settler violence; and eventually Palestinian elections. If such a framework took root, it could evolve – slowly but credibly – into the foundation for the 23-state solution and lasting peace between. Israel and all of its Arab neighbors, including the State of Palestine.