How to Disarm Hamas

We can’t just disarm Hamas. We have to replace it.

With a tenuous ceasefire now in place in Gaza, attention is turning to the next phase of the deal – the gradual “disarming” of Hamas in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal. But there’s a widespread misunderstanding about what that means. Many imagine Hamas willingly surrendering its weapons, or that some future agreement can simply order it to do so. That’s not how this works. Hamas will not disarm itself. The only way to truly neutralize it is by replacing it and showing Palestinians in Gaza that someone other than Hamas can protect and govern them.

Two years ago, while serving in the White House during the early weeks of the war, I drafted an initial paper outlining possible postwar scenarios for Gaza. We saw two broad possibilities.

The first – and most likely – was grim: “Jenin on steroids.” In that scenario, the guns would fall silent, hostages would come home and humanitarian aid would trickle in – but there would be no agreement or momentum for what came next. A weakened Hamas would retain de facto control over much of Gaza, Israel would conduct periodic raids and no real reconstruction or governance would emerge. Gaza would remain a ruin – tense, hungry and unstable. That outcome feels even more plausible today – and, in fact, we’re already seeing it.

But there was also a second option, one based on the hard-learned lessons of the counter-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria – and on the many failures in Iraq, Afghanistan and even Vietnam. The alternative path, the one that could actually disarm Hamas, depends on building new, better structures of security and governance that replace it.

Why would Hamas ever agree to an approach that ultimately leads to its own replacement? Because in its current moment of weakness, Hamas may believe it can ride it out – essentially adopting a “Hezbollah model” in Gaza, where others govern but Hamas still holds the guns.

The challenge for Israel, the United States and the international community is to prove that better governance and security can outcompete Hamas – to make it politically and practically irrelevant and eventually, as it weakens, get it to disarm.

This time, that might actually be possible. Gaza is different from Lebanon in one crucial respect: Israel and Egypt control all its borders. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas cannot easily rearm through Iranian supply lines. Combine that with Hamas’s political weakness – polls show it is deeply unpopular – and the leverage the international community currently holds, and there’s an opportunity to build alternative systems that gradually marginalize Hamas and make rearmament impossible.

It begins with security. Counterinsurgency 101 teaches that the population sides with whoever can provide basic safety and order.

That requires Palestinian forces on the ground who are not affiliated with Hamas but have credibility with the local population. The most realistic option is to use the model of the Palestinian Authority security forces – not because they’re ideal, but because they’re the only existing, semi-legitimate structure capable of the job. After the Second Intifada, and especially after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, US-trained PA forces proved effective in restoring order in parts of the West Bank. Over time, similar forces can be trained, equipped and deployed in Gaza with international backing.

In the short term, however, there must be an interim international security presence – something reflected in President Trump’s 20-point plan. This could be a coalition led by Arab states, with Egypt playing a central role. Such a force would not fight Hamas directly – no country will send troops into Gaza’s tunnels – but it could secure aid routes, prevent looting and work alongside local Palestinian police units that should be part of this effort from the start. Over time, the Palestinian component would grow.

Hamas, recognizing that attacking Egyptian-led forces would isolate it across the Arab world, would likely tolerate such an arrangement – especially in its current weakened state.

Security alone isn’t enough. Gaza also needs a governing structure that excludes Hamas but draws legitimacy from Palestinian participation. That means assembling a technocratic administration of experienced Gazan professionals – those who once ran hospitals, utilities and municipalities – linked to, but not initially dominated by, the Palestinian Authority.

This entity would need broad consent: From key Gazan figures, the PA, Egypt, Qatar, the United States, and yes, tacitly from Israel and even Hamas. The goal is to establish a government capable of providing basic services and coordinating reconstruction with the Arab states and international donors. Paradoxically, this may not be hard to achieve – Hamas has long signaled a desire, like Hezbollah, to step back from day-to-day governance while retaining a military role.

With credible security and governance in place, international donors can finally move in. Reconstruction aid – long promised but rarely delivered – can begin flowing in ways that reach ordinary people rather than Hamas’s coffers. Rebuilding Gaza is not just humanitarian; it’s strategic. Showing that peace and order deliver tangible benefits is the surest way to keep Hamas marginalized.

When we developed these ideas two years ago, I believed that implementation had to begin during the war, not after it. That was the lesson from the counter-ISIS campaign in Syria and Iraq, where stabilization began alongside military operations. Waiting until the guns fall silent, as we did in Iraq in 2003, creates a dangerous vacuum.

Unfortunately, that early planning never happened. Some Israeli defense and intelligence officials, including members of the war cabinet during the first year of the war – Gallant, Gantz and Eisenkot – favored starting transition work during the war, but Prime Minister Netanyahu refused, fearing it would appear to concede Palestinian control over Gaza and threaten his coalition. As a result, we are late. The window is narrower – but it isn’t closed.

In the coming months, the United States, Israel and key Arab partners must stand up a transitional security and governance framework and begin training Palestinian forces. Washington will have to do what it did to secure the ceasefire: Apply sustained pressure on both sides to keep moving, however reluctantly.

There is still a path to disarming Hamas – not by demanding its surrender, but by rendering it irrelevant. That means empowering Palestinians who can govern and protect their own people, and mobilizing the world to rebuild what war has destroyed. If the world does that, then in time, Hamas may have no choice but to fully disarm.

The alternative is permanent chaos: A devastated, ungoverned Gaza where Hamas eventually reemerges from the rubble. After two years of horror, that would not just be a failure. It would be a tragedy.