Hamas and Netanyahu Are Working Together Again

They both prefer a terrible status quo to fully implementing the 20-point plan in Gaza

Three weeks into a ceasefire that is largely holding, the same toxic pattern that has defined Israeli-Palestinian politics for decades is reemerging. Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas – longtime adversaries on the surface – are once again feeding off each other’s extremism, weakening moderates in both societies, and steering Israelis and Palestinians toward yet another cycle of despair. Each needs the other to stay in power.

The latest iteration of this symbiotic relationship would see both sides obstructing progress on implementing the 20-point American peace plan, resulting in a new status quo in which Israel controls half of Gaza and Hamas the other half. Hamas gets to survive and stay in power, while continued Palestinian division and extremism mean Netanyahu need not make any real concessions toward a Palestinian state. Hamas and Netanyahu win; Israelis and Palestinians lose. But this time things can be different.

A Long, Destructive Symbiosis

The strange relationship between Netanyahu and Hamas goes back decades. Thirty years ago, it was Netanyahu’s far-right allies who helped stoke the incitement that ultimately led an Israeli extremist to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Months later, Hamas’s suicide bombings before Israel’s 1996 election helped bring Netanyahu to power for the first time – marking the beginning of the end of the Oslo peace process. Each side thrived on the other’s extremism, and together they buried a historic chance for peace.

When Netanyahu returned to power in 2009, the pattern deepened. After a decade of setbacks – the violence of the Second Intifada and Hamas’s takeover of Gaza – there were glimmers of progress. Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad had begun building functioning institutions in the West Bank, and Palestinian security forces were proving surprisingly effective, cooperating with Israel to maintain calm and counter Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had come relatively close to an agreement through the Annapolis process. That fragile progress could have provided the foundation for renewed state-building and diplomacy. Instead, Netanyahu came to power in 2009 and systematically undermined it.

For nearly 15 years, his strategy was clear: Undercut moderates in the West Bank, empower Hamas in Gaza and keep Palestinians divided. As long as Gaza and the West Bank remained politically split, there could be no meaningful talks on a two-state solution – and Netanyahu could tell Israelis there was “no partner for peace.”

Hamas received a steady flow of cash and legitimacy while the Palestinian Authority (PA) was left to wither. Netanyahu’s governments allowed over a billion dollars in Qatari cash to pass through Ben Gurion Airport into Gaza, bolstering Hamas’s rule and keeping the enclave quiet. At the same time, Israel withheld tax revenues from the PA and lobbied to cut off US aid – choking the only Palestinian institution still committed to nonviolence and security coordination with Israel.

Hamas also reaped huge political rewards, such as the release of more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit. Meanwhile, the PA was vilified for its deeply problematic prisoner payment system, which – while popular in Palestinian society – was used as a pretext to cut off funding to the PA. The message to Palestinians was clear: Violent resistance yields Israeli concessions; moderation yields nothing.

After October 7: Doubling Down

This basic approach continued – and only accelerated – after October 7. I worked on early post-conflict plans for Gaza, many of which resemble the 20-point plan, including developing a transitional international force and a technocratic government. Our proposal envisioned a reformed PA eventually taking over Gaza, since it remains the only viable Palestinian governing body. Israeli defense and intelligence officials were ready to engage on this, but from the start, Netanyahu refused. The order was simple: “No PA.”

Instead, his government pursued half-baked ideas about empowering gangs or clans in Gaza – all of which have failed. Two years that could have been spent building an alternative to Hamas were squandered.

Meanwhile, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich doubled down on starving the PA. In the aftermath of October 7, he withheld half the tax revenues that Israel collects on the PA’s behalf – an arrangement in place since the 1990s. His justification was that the funds were going to Gaza, but most of the money actually supported Gazans explicitly unaffiliated with Hamas – the very technocrats and PA officials needed to build an alternative.

Smotrich also threatened correspondent banking relationships to destabilize the West Bank’s economy and trigger a financial crisis. During the Biden Administration, we worked on meaningful reforms to the PA welfare system to ensure it no longer rewarded Palestinians who committed attacks against Israelis. Israeli technical experts acknowledged the reforms as a step forward. Yet when the PA implemented them earlier this year, Netanyahu’s lieutenants refused to engage seriously and continued to claim this was all a ruse – because admitting progress would justify renewed funding for the PA, something Israel cannot abide.

None of this absolves the PA of responsibility. It is corrupt, ossified and deeply unpopular. Its leaders need to step aside and make room for reform and elections. But Netanyahu’s strategy of weakening Abbas while stabilizing Hamas has helped create this situation. One has to wonder if this is how the PA would look if Israel had spent the last fifteen years empowering it and weakening Hamas.

Repeating the Same Mistakes

Now, just weeks into a fragile ceasefire, both Netanyahu and Hamas seem determined to repeat the same pattern. Netanyahu insists that no postwar planning can begin until every hostage is returned – even though the entire purpose of any post-conflict framework is to ensure Hamas can never again threaten Israeli civilians. More revealingly, the Israeli PM has ruled out any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza’s reconstruction or governance.

Instead, Netanyahu and his coalition partners envision an indefinite Israeli military presence in half of Gaza, with Palestinians somehow being incentivized to move to the Israeli half of the Strip and organizing themselves into a new “moderate” entity – neither Hamas nor the PA – that would magically emerge under Israeli oversight. It’s a fantasy. No such leadership exists, and no people will willingly submit to the army that killed tens of thousands of their civilians.

Faced with the false choice between permanent Israeli control and the return of Hamas, many Palestinians will tragically choose Hamas. That, in turn, will allow Netanyahu to claim once again that there are “no moderate Palestinians to work with.” The cycle of self-justifying extremism will continue.

Hamas, for its part, is already adapting to the post-ceasefire environment. In the absence of a credible governance and security plan that could have been in place more than a year ago, Hamas operatives are reasserting control in parts of Gaza, intimidating rivals and executing suspected collaborators. A divided, stagnant Gaza under partial Israeli control is exactly what Hamas wants: Time and space to rebuild, rearm and reclaim the mantle of “resistance.” Netanyahu’s vision of a fragmented, ungovernable Gaza is their ideal breeding ground.

Both sides are now effectively conspiring – without coordination but with shared interest – to preserve a disastrous status quo: Israel in partial control, Hamas entrenched in the shadows, Palestinians suffering in the rubble and the world too exhausted to intervene.

A Real Alternative Still Exists

After years of dismissing the Palestinians as a sideshow, Arab states are now signaling a serious willingness to engage in the aftermath of this horrific war, whose consequences are reverberating across the region. They are prepared to invest politically, financially and even militarily in an international stabilization force – but only if there is a legitimate Palestinian partner ready to take charge and a genuine political horizon toward Palestinian statehood. And with Hamas weaker than it has been at any point since seizing Gaza in 2007, this is the moment for Arab states to extract concessions that could finally marginalize the movement.

The United States also has tremendous leverage. President Trump – despite his deeply problematic behavior on so many fronts – is extremely popular in Israel, especially among Netanyahu’s political base. Netanyahu has spent years cultivating that image of Trump for his own political benefit. Now it has made it almost impossible for him to say no to Trump publicly. That dynamic gives Trump unique credibility to press for implementation of the 20-point postwar Gaza plan backed by Arab states and much of the international community, though realistically it may take Israeli elections in 2026 and new leadership to bring the full plan to fruition.

If Washington and key Arab capitals coordinate their pressure – one on Israel, the other on Hamas – a new Gaza is still possible. In the short term, that could mean a transitional governing authority of Palestinian technocrats alongside an international stabilization force to help secure Gaza, train Palestinian police and begin to replace Hamas. In the medium to long term, a reformed version of the Palestinian Authority and its security forces could assume governance and security responsibilities, leaving Hamas with little choice but to disarm.

This is a pivotal moment. Israel has a chance to emerge from this war not as a permanent occupying power but as part of a broader regional architecture that integrates it with Arab partners and stabilizes Gaza. Palestinians have a chance, however slim, to begin rebuilding a unified political system grounded in governance rather than militancy. But doing so will require breaking the unholy cycle of dependency between Hamas and Netanyahu – two leaders and movements that have spent decades convincing their people that peace is impossible.