Word on the Street: Gallanter-Winograd Policy Center

The war in Gaza, rising extremist Jewish terror in the West Bank and the US-Israel war with Iran have highlighted the need for a fundamental reassessment of the US-Israel security relationship. The use of American weapons in ways that have resulted in mass civilian casualties and raised serious concerns about war crimes, alongside policies that diverge from US interests, has intensified scrutiny of how American support is structured and delivered. These developments underscore the need for a more sustainable approach that ensures America’s support for Israel is not a blank check.

At the same time, the US-Israel security relationship remains a central pillar of American policy in the Middle East. It reflects decades of close cooperation and overlapping strategic interests. At its best, this partnership has delivered benefits to both countries – from intelligence sharing and joint military operations to technological innovation and regional deterrence.

This memo outlines a framework for recalibrating the US-Israel security relationship across its three core components: arms sales, financial assistance and operational cooperation in order to create a more sustainable alliance that reflects the views of most American Jews:

Arms sales encompasses the sale of US weapons systems, ranging from aircraft and precision-guided munitions to missile defense technologies.
Direct financial support is primarily the roughly $3.8 billion the US provides annually in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and funding for missile defense combined with periodic supplemental packages, which Israel uses to procure US-manufactured defense equipment.
Operational cooperation includes joint military planning, intelligence sharing, military-to-military cooperation and coordinated operations from counterterrorism efforts to regional deterrence.

The goal of this reassessment is to advance the broader American interest of a more stable and prosperous Middle East that includes both Israelis and Palestinians living in security and freedom. The best way to achieve that is through a US-Israel security relationship that treats Israel as a normal ally – not an exception that receives unquestioning, blank check support from the United States.

The United States should phase out direct financial support for arms sales to Israel and treat Israel as it does other wealthy US allies. Israel faces real security challenges that require a significant defense investment. With a per capita GDP comparable to leading US allies such as the United Kingdom, France and Japan, as well as an annual defense budget of over $45 billion, it has the financial means to address these challenges. It does not require almost $4 billion per year in US financial subsidies to purchase weapons (including $3.3 billion in FMF annually, roughly half of America’s FMF budget for the entire world). Continuing this assistance is both unnecessary and politically counterproductive, creating avoidable tensions in US domestic politics and in the bilateral relationship. A responsible and relatively rapid phase-out of all financial assistance, including for ballistic missile defense, is now supported by figures from across the political spectrum, such as Prime Minister Netanyahu, Senator Lindsey Graham, and Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. This reform would normalize the relationship and place Israel in the same category as other capable allies that purchase US defense equipment without subsidy.

US arms sales and other forms of assistance to Israel should be fully consistent with American law. US law already contains several key universal conditions on the provision of security assistance to foreign countries through the Foreign Assistance Act.

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits security assistance to any country whose government engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
Similarly, Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act and 10 U.S.C. 362, which together are known as the “Leahy Laws,” prohibit certain US assistance to individual units of a foreign security force if there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights.
Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits US security assistance or arms sales to any country that blocks or restricts the transport or delivery of US-backed humanitarian aid.

In recent years, some of these laws have not been enforced, and special vetting processes unique to Israel have undermined their credibility. For example, both the Biden and Trump Administrations did not enforce Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act as vigorously as Congress had intended, continuing an unrestricted flow of arms even when the Israeli government was blocking the delivery of US-backed humanitarian aid to Gaza. Similarly, the State Department created a special Israel Leahy Vetting Forum, and while special forums have also been created for Egypt and Ukraine, Israel’s is the most permissive of any country in the world. This has led to unique processes and standards that applied only to Israel and resulted in non-enforcement of the Leahy Laws. These exceptional practices need to end, as they incentivize a lack of accountability and continuation of problematic behavior and policies. The United States should apply the same legal standards to Israel as it does to all other partners, withholding assistance when those standards are not met and restoring it once compliance is achieved.

US arms sales to Israel should be further conditioned to incentivize alignment with American interests and laws – as has been the case with other allies and partners – when their behavior is inconsistent with US interests. Both Congress and the President have taken steps in the past to place specific, additional conditions on arms sales to certain allies, beyond those already contained in US arms export law. When Israeli policies do not align with American policies and interests, Israel should not be able to use American weapons for those policies. That is why J Street supports the Ceasefire Compliance Act (CCA), which makes clear that Israel must adhere to the October 2025 ceasefire agreement and 20-point plan for Gaza that it previously agreed to, facilitate the entrance of humanitarian aid into Gaza, prevent de facto and de jure annexation of the West Bank and take material steps to prevent settler violence. If these conditions are not met, the CCA dictates that Israel cannot use US weapons in Gaza or the West Bank. These are commitments the Israeli government already made, which should be entirely achievable but are currently not being met. Conditioning support in this way reinforces accountability and helps steer policy toward outcomes that advance both US interests and long-term Israeli security.

The United States should maintain a strong security partnership with Israel where our interests align. Israel remains a valuable ally, and the United States should continue to help protect the state and people of Israel. The US also benefits meaningfully from the relationship. Intelligence sharing has been critical in campaigns such as the fight against ISIS, while joint operations such as Israel’s 2006 strike on Syria’s secret nuclear facility have advanced shared security goals. Israeli technological innovations include the Trophy Active Protection System to protect tanks, which has in recent years been integrated into US tanks, and Israeli technological enhancements to the F-35 fighter jet that have now been added to American planes. Where US and Israeli interests align, this cooperation, including joint research and technological investment, should continue. However, all future Research and Development agreements with Israel must include genuine cost-sharing and aim to produce defense items that both countries plan to field. They cannot become a backdoor for continued US subsidies to Israeli defense.

The United States should continue to sell short-range air and ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities to Israel. Systems such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow are jointly developed by Israel and the United States, with American companies working alongside Israel to produce the interceptors for these systems. As such, even though the systems are Israeli, they incorporate US technology. Therefore, as the US responsibly phases out financial subsidies to Israel and Israel buys these systems itself, the sales are still likely to require Congressional notification. Congress should continue to support the sale of interceptors and other system components. These systems are purely defensive and have saved countless civilian lives by intercepting attacks from Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and others. Protecting civilians should be a moral imperative for US policy. This is especially true given that approximately 500,000 American citizens live in Israel, meaning these systems directly protect US nationals as well.

Maximum Territory with Minimum Arabs: How Israel’s Far-Right Government Uses Settler Violence to Pave the Way for Annexation

frank lowenstein — Thu, 09 Apr 2026 20:20:30 GMT

Credit: Yifat Mahel

Settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has reached a tipping point. Recently, it has accelerated so dramatically that even senior Trump Administration officials joined widespread international calls for Prime Minister Netanyahu to take action. What these condemnations miss is that settler violence is not an aberration that Israeli officials have failed to prevent. It is a central component in a systematic campaign by far-right elements in the Israeli government to drive Palestinians out of most of the West Bank and replace them with Israeli settlers.

Unprecedented Levels of Settler Violence

Organized attacks by armed settlers, which former head of Shin Bet Ronen Bar describes as “settler terrorism,” have reached truly unprecedented levels. Over 4,500 settler attacks – four per day – have been recorded since Israel’s far-right government took office in December 2022. Repeated assaults, arson and threats of further violence have entirely depopulated 59 communities in that period – displacing more than 5,500 Palestinians.

These attacks include the murder of dozens of civilians, including three US citizens killed by settlers, none of whose deaths have resulted in criminal charges. The settlers enjoy almost complete impunity from prosecution, with upwards of 96 percent of incidents never resulting in formal charges being filed.

The frequency and severity continue to escalate: Over 1,500 Palestinians were displaced in the first ten weeks of 2026 alone, and eight have been killed by settlers.

The Annexation Strategy Behind the Attacks

Bezalel Smotrich, the minister in charge of the West Bank, has repeatedly called for annexing the West Bank and forcibly displacing its Palestinian residents, stating plainly that “the overriding principle for applying sovereignty [to the West Bank] is maximum territory with minimum Arabs.” Smotrich, a settler who was arrested in 2005 on suspicion of planning to blow up an Israeli highway to protest Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, has also been explicit about the far-right’s ultimate goal: “We will apply sovereignty over the West Bank, initially through actions on the ground and subsequently through legislation and formal recognition.”

Smotrich has unveiled a comprehensive plan that would annex 82 percent of the West Bank – including territory in which some 250,000-300,000 Palestinians live. He has also repeatedly called for “encouraging the emigration” of Palestinians from the West Bank, a thinly veiled euphemism for forced displacement.

The logic of the far-right government is clear. For Israel to annex this territory, Palestinians must first be removed from it. Rather than carry out mass displacement directly and absorb the international backlash, the state empowers armed settlers to do so while preserving a measure of plausible deniability. Settler terrorism is best understood as the kinetic arm of Smotrich’s annexation strategy.

The campaign to forcibly displace Palestinians operates alongside unprecedented settlement construction – over 50,000 new housing units, 98 new settlements and construction in strategic chokepoints that sever Palestinian territorial contiguity. Just last week, the cabinet approved 30 new settlements.

Role of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

While Israel is required under international law to protect the people living in territory it occupies, in many cases the IDF has done the opposite. In fact, this level of violence can only be sustained with the support of the IDF and senior Israeli officials. When settlers attack Palestinian families, they often use weapons and ATVs provided by the government. The IDF soldiers stand guard as the attacks occur – instructed to protect the settlers and arrest Palestinians if they resist. In many cases, the soldiers themselves participate.

The role of the IDF increased dramatically with the massive expansion of the IDF’s regional defense battalions after October 7. They now include over 5,500 settler reservists, further blurring the distinction between the IDF and violent settlers. Many of the same extremists responsible for attacks on Palestinians were enlisted into these battalions and issued military uniforms, army weapons and government vehicles.

Members of the regional defense battalions have been widely documented carrying out attacks on Palestinian communities. Recently, an IDF soldier whose unit detained a CNN crew described their mission clearly: “We are here because this is our land. All the West Bank is ours. [...] Slowly, slowly, this will be a legal settlement.”

The IDF condemned the soldier’s remarks and disciplined his entire battalion. The IDF’s Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth, head of Central Command, also recently publicly denounced settler violence. However, the IDF’s leadership has yet to act sufficiently to alter the reality on the ground, where its soldiers continue to frequently stand by to protect violent settlers – even in the same Palestinian village where the CNN incident took place.

Institutional Support from the Israeli Government (GOI)

The backbone of GOI support comes from the very institutions responsible for preventing settler violence, which are run by officials who share the settlers’ ideology:

The IDF: Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth, who oversees the West Bank, has distributed a book to IDF commanders that describes seizing land from Palestinians in religious terms as “redemption.” Bluth has reportedly introduced a formal mechanism through which the IDF actively helps settlers establish outposts, which routinely serve as launching pads for violent attacks on nearby Palestinian communities. The process includes coordinating the timing and location of each outpost’s creation and deploying forces to guard them.

The Israeli Police: Itamar Ben-Gvir, the National Security Minister who controls the police force, is himself a convicted supporter of Jewish terrorism – including Baruch Goldstein, the perpetrator of the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre. Ben-Gvir has reportedly directed the police force, which is responsible for dealing with Jewish terrorists, not to arrest or investigate violent settlers. He has also spearheaded a government program distributing weapons to West Bank settlers.
The Shin Bet: David Zini, head of Shin Bet, which previously used administrative detention and dedicated investigative resources to preventing Jewish terrorism, is a prominent member of the same extreme wing of the religious Zionist movement as Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. He studied at a far-right religious seminary in Hebron, where students reportedly carried Uzis and roamed the streets with well-known violent settlers. His wife describes the destruction of homes in Gaza and its resettlement as a religious obligation.
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The Security Cost to Israel

As echoed by several former senior Israeli security officials, the far-right’s violent campaign in the West Bank carries a direct cost to Israel’s own security. The Israeli military’s inadequate presence on the Gaza border on the eve of the October 7 attacks was in part driven by the redeployment of forces to the West Bank to protect settlers. Today, settler violence and new settlements require a significant diversion of IDF resources to the West Bank at a time when the military is stretched across active engagements in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. The IDF Chief of Staff himself recently warned the cabinet that the army is nearing its limits, telling ministers, “I’m raising ten red flags for you. At this rate, the IDF will collapse into itself.”

The Ultimate Casualty Will Be Long-Term Peace

While President Trump has often said he is delivering regional peace in the Middle East, the Israeli far-right clearly sees his presidency as an opportunity to permanently seize Palestinian territory, even at the cost of endless conflict. Senior officials in his Administration have recently voiced their frustration at the recent escalation in violence, and their pressure has reportedly resulted in Israeli promises to create a dedicated unit in the Defense Ministry to deal with violent settlers and to sanction Israelis who build outposts in Area B. However, unless the Administration sustains this pressure until Israel’s security forces begin cracking down on violent settlers, the ultimate casualty will be not only the Palestinian communities being driven from their land, but the viability of long-term peace.

The Hezbollah Front of the Iran War and Potential Israel-Lebanon Talks

Avraham Spraragen — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 18:39:42 GMT

Earlier this month, Hezbollah joined the Iran war in solidarity with the Iranian regime – its chief benefactor. The group renewed strikes against Israel, which derailed negotiations between the new Lebanese leadership and the Israeli government. Israel responded by launching major new operations in Lebanon. The ongoing war has already resulted in more than 1,000 deaths in Lebanon, and residents of northern Israel are back in the bomb shelters. As Israel appears poised to launch a full-scale ground invasion of Lebanon, and its Defense Minister vows to flatten Lebanese border villages per the “Gaza model,” this issue brief lays out the current situation and outlines why an Israeli military invasion would harm all of the key actors in the region and squander the historic diplomatic opening between Beirut and Jerusalem.

Hezbollah Remains Intact After Gaza War

On the day after the October 7 Hamas massacre in southern Israel, Hezbollah joined the ensuing war “in solidarity” with Hamas. The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah lasted until a ceasefire took effect on November 27, 2024. During these 13 months, Israel launched its sixth invasion of Lebanon since 1978, killed Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, and targeted Hezbollah with thousands of exploding pagers and walkie-talkies. Lebanon saw more than 3,700 casualties, while 45 Israeli civilians and 73 IDF soldiers were killed. Almost 900,000 people were displaced in Lebanon, and some 60,000 people evacuated their homes in northern Israel.

Israel’s primary objectives during the 2023-2024 conflict with Hezbollah were threefold: (1) Return Israeli residents to the north, (2) push Hezbollah away from the border area, and (3) degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities. By the November 2024 ceasefire, many evacuees had not returned to northern Israel, Hezbollah had not completely withdrawn north of the Litani River, and Hezbollah continued to threaten Israel’s north. Israel managed to reduce the intensity of Hezbollah’s attacks in the short-term, kill many of its members, and inflict serious damage to its infrastructure and stockpiles, but did not fundamentally eliminate Hezbollah’s long-term missile or drone threat.

2024 Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement

After 13 months of fighting, the US and France brokered an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon war. They agreed to stop trading cross-border fire, remove Hezbollah military presence and infrastructure south of Litani, and expand deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon in parallel with a phased Israeli military withdrawal from the area. The parties later agreed to extend the 60-day ceasefire to February 18, 2025, at which time the IDF had withdrawn from most of southern Lebanon while maintaining five military outposts there. Between November 2024 and February 2025, both sides repeatedly violated the ceasefire agreement, with near-daily IDF attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah actively rebuilding and rearming.

Hezbollah Joins the Iran War

On March 2, in response to the US-Israeli decision last month to initiate war against Iran and assassinate Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah opened another warfront by resuming its rocket attacks on Israel. Israel responded with strikes. At least 1,000 people have already been killed in Lebanon, thousands more have been injured, and one million have been displaced. One Israeli civilian and two Israeli soldiers have been killed. Roughly 13 percent of Lebanon is under Israeli forced displacement and mass evacuation orders, compelled by Israel to move northward. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz ordered the IDF to accelerate home demolitions along the border – “in line with the model we applied in Gaza’s Rafah and Beit Hanoun.”

IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir said recently that the Israeli military campaign has “only just begun,” as fears grow of another full-scale Israeli ground invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. Indeed, Katz announced today that Israel will maintain control of southern Lebanon up to the Litani. Far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich went further by proposing that the Litani replace the Blue Line (the de facto Israel-Lebanon border) as the new border. Perhaps even more worryingly, on the other side of the political spectrum, Israeli President Isaac Herzog (formerly of the Labor Party) is advocating for IDF “strategic depth” in Lebanon.

Another Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Looms

After an Israeli strike damaged the Qasmiye bridge, one of the main routes linking south and central Lebanon, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the attack a “prelude to a ground invasion.” Aoun further warned that IDF attacks on civilian infrastructure are “an attempt to sever the geographical connection between the southern Litani region and the rest of Lebanese territory.” Israel has also unlawfully deployed white phosphorus in residential areas and has struck Lebanese healthcare workers, medical facilities, and first responders. This escalation is leading to growing Lebanese concerns that Israel could yet again occupy the country, reminiscent of the nearly two decades of Israeli occupation that ended when the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.

The 1982 invasion effectively produced Hezbollah and a repeat occupation would only bolster it. Another full-scale invasion and permanent occupation would provide greater legitimacy to Hezbollah, boosting its resistance narrative at a time when support for the group is declining within Lebanese society. The Lebanese people are increasingly frustrated by Hezbollah dragging the country into wars – on behalf of Hamas in 2023 and now on Iran’s behalf – and are exhausted from all the explosions and evacuations. Israel’s relentless attacks threaten to further undermine the Lebanese government, perceived as weak in confronting both Israel and Hezbollah, and push the disaffected back into the arms of the Iran-backed Shia militant group as the only “true” protector against Israeli aggression. If Israel continues to pursue the morally bankrupt and grossly misguided “Gaza model” in Lebanon, it will squander a historic diplomatic opening with the new leadership in Beirut and bury any chance for an eventual Israel-Lebanon peace.

New Leadership in Beirut and Defeating Hezbollah

In January 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam came to power, changing the political landscape of the country. Aoun and Salam are committed to disarming Hezbollah and have repeatedly expressed an openness to negotiate with Israel. In August 2025, the Lebanese government adopted the “National Shield” (Dir al-Watan) plan, a five-phase roadmap to disarm Hezbollah – informed by an earlier US proposal and buttressed by a $230 million US investment in the LAF. However, it is an open question whether this new government can succeed in ultimately disarming Hezbollah.

The Lebanese army announced in January that it completed the first phase of its Hezbollah disarmament plan, claiming to have taken control south of the Litani. This claim has since been undermined by Hezbollah’s March 2nd resumption of strikes against Israel from southern Lebanon. In February, the LAF announced a four-month timeline for completing the second phase of the plan, which concerns the area between the Litani and Awali rivers. US Central Command confirmed last year that the LAF had successfully removed approximately 10,000 of Hezbollah’s rockets, 400 missiles, and 205,000 unexploded ordnance fragments.

Despite this initial progress, Hezbollah is relying on its sustained links to Iran and strong domestic foundations to make a comeback. Hezbollah has managed relatively quickly to partially reconstitute its arsenal, restore its command structure, and refinance – demonstrating the futility of Israel’s narrow military approach. Hezbollah is not just a paramilitary force, it also has considerable political and financial power in Lebanon. Permanently defeating Hezbollah will therefore require a more holistic approach that combines military disarmament with careful diplomacy, targeted sanctions, and support for the new leadership in Beirut, state institutions, and the Lebanese people.

Prospects for Israel-Lebanon Peace

Lebanese Olive Branch: Back in December, Lebanon and Israel held their first direct talks in forty years, which have been derailed by the ongoing violence. On March 9, President Aoun called for a resumption of negotiations, while also accusing Hezbollah of betraying his country by joining the Iran war. Prime Minister Salam repeated this call last week, declaring that “we are ready for negotiations with Israel” and pleading for US intervention. He also lamented that Hezbollah has rendered Lebanon “a battlefield of the war between Israel and Iran.” On Sunday, the Lebanese prime minister reiterated that “we have dropped the idea of prohibiting talks with Israel.” The US welcomed this outreach to Israel, but appeared to cast doubt on the possibility of negotiations during wartime. Meanwhile, Netanyahu reportedly tapped his longtime aide, former Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, to lead negotiations with Lebanon, though it appears for now that Israel has rebuffed Lebanon’s offer to resume talks.

French Plan: By contrast, Lebanon has accepted a new French ceasefire proposal as a basis for negotiations with Israel. France is now engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Jerusalem to help bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The French plan would require Lebanon to recognize Israel, IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, LAF redeployment to southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah disarmament – including a verification mechanism involving the UN Security Council and UN Interim Force in Lebanon. France also proposed that Israel and Lebanon begin the process of ending the formal state of war that began at Israel’s founding.

Historic Opportunity: This grand bargain of Lebanese recognition for Israeli withdrawal is a historic opportunity that must not be wasted. Former Israeli Air Force Chief Nimrod Sheffer and former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff and head of the Democrats Party, Yair Golan, are both making the case for diplomacy over war on Israel’s northern front. Long-term stability on this front can be achieved “only by effective co-operation between Israel and the Lebanese government,” said former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. After two years of war in Gaza and with the Iran war spreading across the region, the Middle East is ripe for change. Like in Beirut, new leadership has emerged in Damascus that supports rapprochement with Israel and disarming Hezbollah. The deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, an ally of the Islamic Republic, was replaced in 2024 by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose government is preventing the smuggling of Iranian arms to Hezbollah via the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Policy Recommendations

The United States should heed the call from the new Lebanese leadership and push for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It should commit to a sustained diplomatic effort to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The US should consider expanding its $230 million investment in Lebanon to boost the Lebanese economy, state institutions, and the legitimacy of the new leadership. The Trump Administration is right to be lobbying allies to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization and to impose additional sanctions on the group. At the same time, the administration must ensure that military aid to Israel is not being used by the IDF against Lebanese civilians.

Israel must cease its relentless attacks on Lebanese civilian infrastructure and its use of white phosphorus in residential areas. Instead of providing fodder to Hezbollah, the Israeli government should commit to a phased IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in parallel with LAF redeployment to the Southern Litani Area. Israel should work with the new Lebanese leadership, in conjunction with the US, UN, and other partners, on a holistic approach to verified disarmament and permanent defeat of Hezbollah. Israel should also accept the olive branch extended by Lebanon and return to the negotiating table.
Lebanon must not retract its olive branch to Israel, despite current Israeli intransigence. The Lebanese government should redouble efforts to disarm Hezbollah and rid the country of Iran’s malign influence. Beirut’s announcement today that it expelled the Iranian ambassador, declaring him persona non grata, is a step in the right direction – as is the government’s recent move to deport members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Lebanon must also commit additional troops south of the Litani and allow the US, UN, and Israel to verify progress on its five-phase disarmament plan. In addition to pursuing a monopoly on arms, the government should extend its ban on Hezbollah’s military activities to the political and financial realms. Through effective governance, improved economic management, and strategic engagement with Israel, the new leadership in Beirut can restore confidence in state institutions, heal sectarian divisions, and undermine Hezbollah’s legitimacy.

The Iran War Spreads to the Gulf Region

Jen Gavito — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 15:50:59 GMT

As the conflict with Iran enters its third week, the Gulf Arab countries continue to bear the heaviest brunt of a conflict that was not of their choosing. While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) harbor no illusions about the destructive nature of the Iranian regime nor of its desire to spread terror and sow regional instability, they have nonetheless gone to great lengths in recent years to develop and maintain a shaky detente. This semblance of stability has been key to the ambitious economic diversification strategies undertaken by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, in particular. These strategies have also underpinned President Trump’s second-term economic agenda for the Middle East, which culminated in the signing of more than $1.4 trillion in new deals during his May visit to the region and which is now being undermined as the conflict spreads throughout the region.

The Gulf as a Target

The conflict with Iran is largely a war of choice, with an ever-moving set of objectives given by the Trump Administration, ranging from regime change to degradation of nuclear, missile, and drone programs. As the administration continues to refine its purpose, Iran has responded by lashing out against all six GCC member states, as well as Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. Iran’s strategic logic in striking the Gulf is clear: the Gulf states are major strategic partners of the United States and key contributors to regional stability and the global economy. Attacks on the Gulf can drive pressure on Trump to end the war, both from Gulf leaders and from an American public that is already experiencing the burden of rising oil prices.

The real and perceived closeness between Israel and the Gulf is another contributing factor; the UAE – the first Gulf state to join the Abraham Accords – has received more than half as many drone attacks as all other states combined. Meanwhile, Iran’s public justification for the strikes has been that several of the Gulf countries host US military installations, with over 50,000 personnel deployed throughout the region (including 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain and the forward HQ of the US Central Command in Qatar).

In Iranian Sights: Infrastructure, Energy, and Military Targets Dominate

Since the outbreak of the Iran war on February 28, the Islamic Republic has struck or attempted to strike five known US military installations in the Gulf. Despite Iran launching thousands of missiles and drones, most of these strikes have been intercepted by US-manufactured surface-to-air defense systems, including the higher-altitude Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and lower-altitude Patriot systems. Several US military sites in the Gulf did, however, sustain damage. Furthermore, six US service members were killed in a March 1 Iranian strike near Camp Arifjan, a seventh was killed at Prince Sultan Air Base, and six more were killed in a plane crash in neighboring Iraq. Iran has also aggressively targeted US diplomatic facilities in Dubai, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, as well as a hotel in Bahrain – injuring American contractors.

Iran’s attacks on the Gulf have not been limited to US military targets; the regime has attacked civilian sites, tourist and financial hubs, residential areas, energy infrastructure, and major airports – including repeated strikes against the world’s busiest airport in Dubai. As Iran has drawn down its supplies of conventional weapons, it has increasingly turned to asymmetric attacks utilizing its considerable cyber capabilities and disruption of the transportation route via the Strait of Hormuz to wreak economic havoc.

Economic Impacts Build: From the Gulf to the Global Economy

Apart from the rising death and injury tolls, the Iran war has the potential to cause further economic devastation in the Gulf and beyond. It is already decimating the Gulf’s tourism industry and creating what the International Energy Agency (IEA) has called the biggest oil supply disruption in history. Gulf states have been forced to temporarily but repeatedly close their airspace, disrupting flights and leaving tens of thousands of Americans stranded in the early days of the conflict. Iran has also attacked oil tankers, cargo, and other commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, as well as oil refineries, gas facilities, and vital ports.

Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical waterway for shipments of energy and other key commodities, along with corresponding spikes in insurance for shippers in the area, have brought traffic there to a virtual standstill. This has sent the prices of oil soaring and threatens supplies of aluminum and helium that are key inputs into products like fertilizer and chips. The coming weeks are therefore expected to see dramatic increases in the costs of food, medicine, and other consumer products. The US-Israeli war against Iran is already costing the global economy billions of dollars and could result in hiring freezes, layoffs, and economic recession, depending on how long it takes to find an off-ramp. As a countermeasure, the IEA announced that it will release 400 million barrels of oil from its emergency stockpile, the largest reserves distribution in history.

Gulf Response to the Conflict

The Gulf is bearing the consequences of a war it did not choose and over which its leaders have limited influence. Gulf states are unlikely to join offensive operations against Iran, as doing so would make them primary targets of Iran and further threaten their economies. The GCC has also opted against retaliatory strikes against Iran, upholding the longstanding policy of avoiding direct confrontation with the Islamic Republic. The Gulf nonetheless recognizes the potential for further destabilization emanating from Iran and has provided considerable passive support.

The GCC swiftly condemned Iran’s attacks on the Gulf as a breach of sovereignty and international law and joined the European Union in calling for de-escalation. Gulf states implemented various emergency security protocols and increased their air defense readiness, coordinating with partners to intercept Iranian missiles and drones. The UAE also closed its embassy in Tehran and withdrew its diplomats. On March 11, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2817, by a vote of 13-0, demanding the immediate cessation of Iranian aggression. Bahrain submitted this UNSC resolution on behalf of the GCC, demonstrating both a united front against Iranian aggression and a shared commitment to diplomacy with Iran that transcends the growing Saudi-Emirati rivalry.

The Gulf has also provided direct support to US operations via basing access and intelligence sharing, in addition to air defense coordination. In recent days, President Trump has called on the Gulf countries to take a more active role in securing the Strait of Hormuz via maritime patrols or operations. Doing so risks direct confrontation with Iran and discussions over what role the Gulf countries might be willing to play remain ongoing. For his part, Senator Lindsey Graham, a top Trump ally and chief advocate for the Iran war, gave Saudi Arabia an ultimatum: join the war or “consequences will follow.”

Whither US-Gulf and Iran-Gulf Relations?

The Trump Administration has been responding to Iran’s attacks on the Gulf with overwhelming US military force, as part of its broader “Operation Epic Fury.” In addition to coordinating with GCC partners on missile defense, the US has significantly increased military deployments to the Gulf – including additional marines and warships, issued travel warnings, ordered the departure of non-emergency US personnel from the Gulf, and closed the US embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In response to Iran’s attack on the Gulf’s oil supply, Trump ordered the bombing of Kharg Island, from where the Iranian regime exports about 90 percent of its oil. Furthermore, the US Energy Department announced the release of 172 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to counteract skyrocketing energy prices.

This support notwithstanding, some prominent Gulf allies have criticized the US for prioritizing Israeli security over their own, despite high-profile security and defense agreements recently signed with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. There are also reports that some Gulf partners are reviewing recent investments in the US as they attempt to triage the economic impacts of the conflict. Amidst long-standing delays in the delivery of defense articles, which are in critical demand, as well as reports of dwindling stockpiles and other controlled technologies such as chips, the Gulf states will almost certainly take stock of their partnerships with the US at the war’s end and consider diversification of alliances moving forward in order to better hedge against future US actions that threaten their economic futures.

As for relations with Iran, what was once a shaky detente will now be viewed as a critical threat thanks to a surviving regime that is both more hardline than its predecessor and more willing to deploy asymmetric capabilities to disrupt and threaten its neighbors.

Policy Recommendations

The Trump Administration should clarify the strategic objectives of the conflict and seek a negotiated conclusion that stabilizes markets and, to the extent possible given the destructive nature of the Iranian regime, avoids recurrent cycles in the near or medium term. It should further prioritize the security of Gulf partners by accelerating the delivery of new defense systems, including additional THAAD and Patriot batteries; air defense interceptors, counter-drone technologies, and cyber defense capabilities. Following the conclusion of the conflict, the administration will need to work to reassure Gulf allies of the continued value of the strategic partnership with the US.

The US Congress should urgently exercise its oversight of the Trump Administration’s war objectives, ensuring that military operations remain aligned with clearly defined national security goals. It should expedite the review and approval of defense articles to Gulf partners, including through joint training and technology sharing. Congress should work closely with the administration to support initiatives related to maritime security and diplomatic de-escalation initiatives, while maintaining pressure on Iran’s destabilizing regional activities.

Israel should remove regime change in Iran as a goal of the current conflict in acknowledgement that it is both futile and destabilizing for the region and precludes a negotiated resolution to the current round of violence. To avoid unwelcome geopolitical and environmental impacts, including potential spikes in refugee flows and violence beyond Iran’s borders, Israel should work with the US in support of a long-term negotiated solution that addresses nuclear, military, and proxy capabilities, acknowledging that the Iran conflict cannot be permanently won through military means alone.

Gulf states should maintain a unified diplomatic front in condemning Iranian aggression while continuing to advocate for de-escalation and working towards greater security integration within the GCC. Once safe to do so, they should expand maritime security cooperation with the US and other neighbors to protect shipping lanes and energy flows from future shocks. Gulf countries should continue to partner with the US in building cyber resilience and defensive capabilities, while serving as a vital intermediary in developing a long-term, negotiated resolution to Iran’s destabilizing behaviors and ambitions.

A Roadmap to the 23-State Solution – Regional Peace and a Palestinian State

J Street Staff — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 16:45:30 GMT

Overview

Since the early months of the Gaza war, J Street has advocated for a 23-state solution, which would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state but frames the issue in both language and strategy that is more likely to succeed than a continued focus on a two-state solution. The idea, as elaborated by J Street president Jeremy Ben-Ami, is to leverage the desire for regional integration to create a “win-win-win.” Israel fulfills its founders’ dreams of global acceptance, Palestinians secure an independent state, and the Arab world gains an economic, technological, security, and intelligence partner. Despite the challenges posed by the current conflict with Iran and recent regional tensions, this pathway remains the most compelling approach towards long-term peace between Israelis, Palestinians, and the rest of the region.

The most significant challenge to this vision is an Israeli government that actively opposes and works to undermine any form of Palestinian sovereignty, both in the West Bank and in Gaza. Moderate Arab states – Saudi Arabia chief amongst them – have repeatedly emphasized that normalization requires a credible pathway toward a Palestinian state, and President Trump’s 20-point plan explicitly recognizes that “Palestinian self-determination and statehood” is “the aspiration of the Palestinian people.” Yet the Netanyahu government’s unprecedented rate of settlement expansion in the West Bank, along with its opposition to any Palestinian Authority (PA) involvement in governing Gaza, serves its stated goal of thwarting a Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s government may lose power this year through elections required no later than October 2026, which could open a window for progress. However, its current actions in the West Bank and Gaza threaten to undermine future normalization efforts. Hence, in the immediate term, Israel must be deterred from unilaterally altering the status quo in ways that prevent a future Palestinian state from emerging.

This paper projects beyond the shelf-life of the current Israeli government, outlining a longer-term policy approach designed to create conditions for a 23-state solution. The framework focuses on four parallel lines of effort that should be pursued simultaneously: (1) fully implementing Phase II of the Gaza ceasefire; (2) containing and reversing Israel’s annexationist policies in the West Bank; (3) strengthening, empowering, and reforming the Palestinian Authority; and (4) facilitating de-escalation and increased cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Line of Effort #1: Implementing Phase II of the Gaza Ceasefire

Gaza remains a key obstacle to progress toward Palestinian statehood and regional normalization. As long as Gaza remains in a state of humanitarian catastrophe and is occupied by the Israeli military, no Arab states will normalize relations with Israel. At the same time, no Israeli government, even a more moderate future alternative, will agree to Palestinian independence in Gaza so long as an armed Hamas remains in power. Success in implementing the Phase II elements of the 20-point plan means resolving these obstacles by: (1) addressing the humanitarian crisis; (2) facilitating the reconstruction of Gaza; (3) creating an alternative security reality where Hamas is disarmed and replaced; (4) ensuring Israel withdraws its troops from Gaza; and (5) allowing the Palestinians to govern themselves. Success in achieving these elements will require sustained engagement and support by the US and key Arab and Muslim states.

Responding to immediate needs: While humanitarian conditions have improved significantly since the October 2025 ceasefire went into effect, particularly with respect to the availability of food, the harsh winter months have highlighted the inadequate shelter that is available for the approximately 90 percent of the population that is displaced. Limited availability of medicines, clean water, and fuel, as well as Israeli efforts to limit the roles of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and various international nongovernmental organizations, are also affecting the well-being of the population. Hence, even before long-term reconstruction plans can be implemented, the immediate needs of the population must be addressed.

Reconstruction: With more than 90 percent of homes and almost all key infrastructure damaged or destroyed, rebuilding Gaza is a core component of the second phase of the ceasefire. Reconstruction is estimated to cost upwards of $70 billion, requiring significant investments by the US and, most importantly, its Arab partners in the region. Key to securing this financing is addressing potential donors’ legitimate fears that future rounds of conflict would, again, destroy donor-financed projects, as well as convincing Israel to ease its restrictions on “dual-use” items – especially cement, steel, and machinery – that are essential to the reconstruction efforts. Progress on the security front, as discussed below, along with US leadership, will be key to both instilling confidence in donor states and convincing the Israelis to allow construction supplies into the Strip.

Disarming and replacing Hamas: Key to the long-term success of the Gaza ceasefire – a precondition to full regional normalization – is the ability of the US and its allies to alter the security reality in Gaza. Taking steps towards a monopoly on force throughout the Strip that is neither Hamas nor Israel would unlock progress toward the significant foreign investment needed for reconstruction, Palestinian self-governance, and an Israeli withdrawal.

To date, senior Hamas officials have denied their intent to disarm completely. However, the US should maintain pressure on Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt to convince Hamas to hand over its heavy weapons and to transfer responsibility for internal security in Gaza to an alternative force. The timing and mechanics for implementing such an arrangement are subject to further negotiations, as is a potential program through which Hamas and other militants would hand over their small arms and be reintegrated as civilians into Gazan society.

Parallel to disarmament, the role of maintaining internal security within Gaza – previously carried out by Hamas-aligned police forces – must be transferred to an alternative force. The early deployment of the International Stabilization Force is essential to bolster the ceasefire and to support the training of an alternative Palestinian police force, which would operate in coordination with the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
Ensuring an Israeli withdrawal: Israel currently controls 53 percent of Gaza’s territory. A sustained Israeli presence inside most of Gaza will hinder reconstruction and normalization efforts. As progress is made on disarming and replacing Hamas with both Palestinian and international forces, the US must pressure Israel to live up to its end of the bargain and pursue a phased withdrawal plan. An Israeli withdrawal will facilitate prospects for full Palestinian self-governance in Gaza.

Line of Effort #2: Limit and Reverse Israel’s Accelerated Annexation of the West Bank

There will be no regional normalization so long as Israel continues down the path of advancing the annexation of the West Bank. As Saudi Arabia and the UAE made clear in September 2025, when Israel appeared poised to annex parts of the West Bank, annexation would not only thwart all prospects of Saudi-Israeli normalization but also jeopardize the Abraham Accords. Despite this, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also oversees the West Bank, has been explicit about his goal of annexing the West Bank, and has proven adroit at creating facts on the ground since entering Netanyahu’s government in late 2022. During this period, the Israeli government has established a record number of new settlements, enabled the construction of a record number of illegal outposts, and allowed settlers to attack and displace dozens of Palestinian communities with impunity. Smotrich has also approved construction in E1, which would bisect the West Bank and further isolate East Jerusalem. While stopping short of legal annexation, these actions signal to the Arab world Israel’s intent to permanently occupy significant swaths of the West Bank and to prevent a Palestinian state from emerging, making regional normalization seemingly impossible.

The US strategic priority is preserving the possibility of a future 23-state solution. To that end, the US should work with the Abraham Accords nations and Saudi Arabia, including through direct appeals to the Israeli public, to demand Israel halt its progress towards annexation, focusing on steps that alter the status quo and are difficult to reverse. Messaging should focus on the incredible opportunity Israel currently has to be integrated into the region, and how its actions in the West Bank are undermining this possibility.

The next step – reversing elements of Smotrich’s takeover of the West Bank – will likely require the formation of a more moderate Israeli government. Once feasible, the US should work with Israel to dismantle illegal outposts and dramatically reduce settlement construction. Further steps, including settlement freezes and transfers of authority over parts of the West Bank to the PA – linked to incentives provided by the US and regional actors – should be core components of the roadmap proposed in Line of Effort #4.

Line of Effort #3: Strengthening and Revitalizing the Palestinian Authority

A strong and credible PA is essential to ensuring that a transition to an independent Palestinian state is achievable. Given that progress toward Palestinian statehood is crucial to unlocking regional normalization, reforming and revitalizing the PA should be core to the US effort to advance the 23-state solution.

In recent years, poor Palestinian leadership, Israeli policies undermining the PA, and declining international support have driven the PA’s state-building project in the wrong direction. President Mahmoud Abbas has been in office for over two decades since being elected to a four-year term in 2005, legislative elections were last held in 2006, and the PA’s main legislative body has not convened since 2007. As a result, the PA suffers from a severe public legitimacy deficit that makes it difficult to govern effectively or negotiate credibly on behalf of the Palestinians.

President Abbas has made some progress on reforming the PA – revoking the prisoner payments program and installing a technocratic-oriented government. However, these reforms have failed to satisfy the Palestinian public and external critics. The current reality requires progress in three key areas, each of which requires the cooperation of international actors, the Israeli government, and the PA itself:

Overcoming a severe lack of political legitimacy by pursuing elections and good governance. The PA’s failure to hold national elections since 2006 has precluded the possibility of holding its leaders politically accountable. Abbas continues to wield vast authoritarian powers and has largely governed via executive decrees since 2007. Yet a survey released in October 2025 demonstrates that 80 percent of the public favors his resignation, and a majority of Palestinians consider the PA a burden on the Palestinian people.

Abbas has promised that presidential and legislative council elections will take place within one year of the end of the Gaza war. While many doubt that this timeline is feasible, the international community – led by the US and Arab partners – should insist that the PA take concrete steps that will facilitate competitive and credible national elections when conditions are right. Securing Israel’s cooperation in permitting these elections will also be crucial, particularly concerning the participation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Once elections are agreed upon, the US and its European partners should provide assistance and oversight to ensure they are free and fair, and perceived as such, and to convince Israel that permitting such elections will serve the broad interest of PA reform. The question of which parties and candidates are authorized to participate in upcoming elections will be highly contested, especially regarding the participation of Hamas. At a minimum, all parties or candidates running should be required to renounce violence. Municipal elections in the West Bank, currently scheduled for April 25, will demonstrate the administrative capabilities of the Palestinian Central Election Commission and the degree of inclusivity and competitiveness that is possible under current conditions.
Reasserting security in the West Bank. Movement restrictions, rampant settler violence, and regular IDF incursions into areas under Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) control have eroded the PA’s legitimacy by reinforcing perceptions that it cannot protect or represent Palestinians. These actions also impair the Palestinian economy and fuel support for hard-line rejectionists, including Hamas. Reviving the Palestinian state-building project therefore requires increased PASF control over internal security. To that end, the US should work to ensure Israel accepts the PA’s sole authority in Area A. Over time, as the PA implements reforms and reasserts security control, Israel should begin handing over additional control of sections of the West Bank to the PA, converting them from Area C to Area B or A, and from B to A.

Improving the PA’s fiscal situation by applying pressure on Israel to change its policies and bringing in the international community. The lack of control that the PA has over its revenue base further undermines its credibility and popularity. Per the 1994 Paris Protocol, Israel collects taxes and customs duties on the PA’s behalf and is supposed to then transfer those funds. Amounting to close to 70 percent of the PA’s annual budget, this mechanism grants Israel significant leverage. Since 2006, Israel has regularly withheld these payments to penalize the Palestinians for actions it deems hostile, escalating this practice severely after October 7 by withholding nearly half of the annual funds owed.

The damage this fiscal dependence does to the PA’s legitimacy is two-fold: First, it undermines the PA’s ability to govern effectively – civil servants’ salaries are often delayed or withheld, its debt continues to rise, and investors fear investing in a territory with such a volatile financial record. Second, the PA’s dependence on Israel, which the Palestinians broadly view as an occupier, reinforces the public’s perception that the PA’s leadership cannot stand up to Israel or, worse yet, is complicit in their occupation.

Restoring predictable revenue flows should be a priority. The US should immediately require Israel to divorce clearance revenue payments from political disagreements. A long-term policy priority should be forming an alternative tax collection mechanism to bolster the PA’s independence and improve economic predictability.

Compounding the impact of Israel’s weaponization of the Paris Protocol is the decline in recent years of international assistance to the PA. Foreign budgetary assistance has decreased significantly – present levels are over 70 percent lower than in the late 2000s. Combined with Israel’s withholding of revenues, this has left the PA starved of funds and with mounting debts. Along with strengthening the PA’s ability to regularly receive tax revenues, the US and regional partners should engage directly with the PA to commit the Palestinian leadership to a reform plan, with benchmarks directly linked to a substantial increase in foreign assistance.

What must not be lost in discussions of PA reform is that true revitalization requires a fundamental reorientation by Israel. Between 2009 and October 7, 2023, successive Israeli governments have pursued a strategy of systematically weakening the PA while empowering Hamas as a way to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. A return to a coherent, coordinated policy approach by the US and Israel that prioritizes empowering a reformed, moderate PA and weakening Hamas will be crucial to preserving the possibility of a future Palestinian state, and by extension, broad regional normalization. The US can signal its commitment to this effort by recognizing a Palestinian state today, joining the more than 150 countries around the world that already have.

Line of Effort #4: Building Regional Bridges

Parallel to progress toward advancing conditions in Israel and Palestine, the US should develop a roadmap for linking increased Israeli-Arab cooperation to concrete milestones related to Israeli progress as outlined in Lines of Effort 1-3. The United States, supported by European and other allies, should play a proactive role in facilitating the resolution of emergent sensitive political issues and in holding the parties accountable to their respective commitments. Arab countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia, should make direct appeals to the Israeli public regarding their interest in integrating Israel into the region while restating their firm commitment to Palestinian statehood. A calibrated basket of carrots and sticks, including arms and trade deals, and financial support through grants and loans, must be readily available to support the process.

In the immediate term, the parties should move forward with ready-to-go initiatives that demonstrate a sincere commitment to long-term regional integration:

De-escalating regional tensions: The United States should continue to work toward a non-aggression pact between Israel and Syria. In addition, the United States should encourage the implementation of all elements of the November 2024 ceasefire arrangements and ensure that Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon is permanently reduced. Central to these efforts is continuing to support the Syrian and Lebanese governments as they seek to project greater control over their respective territories and to reduce the influence of militias.

Deepening security cooperation between Israel and the Arab states: Security cooperation between Israel and the Arab States has deepened in recent years, especially after US Central Command (CENTCOM) was assigned responsibility for Israel and has actively worked to enhance Israeli-Arab cooperation. The benefits of this cooperation were most visible in the United States’ ability, with the cooperation of Arab partners, to assist Israel in defending against Iranian missile attacks in 2024 and 2025. It is unclear at the moment what impact the current war with Iran will have as it could drive the Gulf states closer to Israel or result in more tensions if the Gulf states see Israeli and American behavior as putting them in the line of Iranian fire. Meanwhile, Israel-Egypt and Israel-Jordan security cooperation remains strong despite political disagreements between their governments. The US should continue to play a facilitating role in bringing Israel together with its Arab partners to manage and respond to shared security challenges.

Promoting cooperation on discrete, limited, mutually beneficial projects: Israel’s gas deals with Egypt and Lebanon in recent years, along with its past cooperation with Jordan on water rights, demonstrate that Israel and its Arab neighbors can be brought closer together by identifying areas of mutual benefit short of full normalization. Similar cooperation should be pursued in artificial intelligence, agriculture, water, and clean energy. While the full benefits of cooperation in these areas will only be reached with full normalization, genuine cooperation on targeted projects can build trust, deepen economic and people-to-people ties, and build momentum toward broader integration. Perhaps most importantly, successful cooperation demonstrates the upside of normalization and fosters familiarity among political and business leaders who influence their governments’ policies.

Achieving the 23-state solution will take time, require experimentation, and inevitably be messy. Yet, the formula for achieving it is clear: (1) implement Phase II of the Gaza peace plan; (2) restrain and reverse annexationist Israeli policies in the West Bank; (3) reinvest in and reinforce the Palestinian nation-building project; and (4) strengthen Israel’s relationships with its Arab neighbors. Taken together, these actions will eventually set the conditions for an outcome far superior to the continued pathway of war and suffering that has long characterized Israel’s relations both with the Palestinians and with its Arab neighbors.

Arab Israeli Politics and Society Ahead of the 2026 Israeli Election

Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 18:04:16 GMT

[Image via Zaher333]

While all eyes are on Iran, the 2026 Israeli election is forthcoming and Arab Israelis facing an unrelenting crime wave are likely to play a decisive role. Ahead of the election, Arab Israelis – including those who identify as Palestinian citizens of Israel – and their Jewish allies are protesting Israeli government discrimination. Under political pressure, the four major Arab parties revived the Joint List electoral alliance, aiming to boost Arab voter turnout and help defeat Netanyahu. The Joint List could potentially help bring down the prime minister with the cooperation of the Zionist opposition. This issue brief analyzes the state of Arab Israeli politics and society, including the revival of the Joint List and prospects for Arab-Jewish political partnership.

Anti-Palestinian Crackdown and Political Persecution

Throughout the Gaza war, the Israeli government cracked down on Palestinian citizens of Israel who engaged in anti-war activism – or even expressed solidarity for Gazan civilians. The Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel documented punitive measures, including:

Mass arrests, detentions, firings, suspensions, and an Israel Police ban on solidarity protests;
Palestinian students at Israeli universities were disciplined for their social media posts;
Arab citizens were threatened with deportation;
The Knesset passed a series of laws that are used to target Arab Israelis;
Arab Knesset Member Ayman Odeh was nearly expelled; and
Sally Abed of Standing Together, Israel’s largest Arab-Jewish unity group, was terminated from the Haifa City Council and told to “go to Gaza.”

Israeli Government Neglect and Arab Israeli Protests

Last month, mass protests erupted in the Arab city of Sahknin in northern Israel as Arab society went on strike. Tens of thousands of Arabs in Israel demonstrated against rising crime in the Arab community and the Israeli government’s neglect of its Arab citizens. The protests have since spread to other parts of the country, including outside the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where protesters declared a state of emergency and blamed the Netanyahu government. Many Jewish Israelis have joined the protest movement in solidarity with the Arab community. On January 31, Arabs and Jews gathered in Tel Aviv for the largest joint protest in Israel’s history.

Arab citizens account for about 80 percent of documented murders in Israel. In 2025, 252 Arab Israelis were victims of murder – the deadliest year on record for the Arab community. 65 Arab Israelis have been murdered already in 2026. On Sunday, the Arab mayor of Arraba in northern Israel and his deputy were shot. Far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who oversees the Israel Police, has grossly underfunded anti-crime efforts in the Arab community. Furthermore, Israeli government funding for Arab society has been slashed by approximately $550 million – including $68.3 million for social and educational programs – with Arab citizens receiving less than 4 percent of the latest state budget despite constituting over 20 percent of the population. These extreme budget cuts exacerbate the disparities between Arabs and Jews in sectors ranging from education and healthcare to housing and transportation.

The Arab Joint List and Arab Voting Patterns

Founded in 2015, the Joint List is a political alliance of the four Arab-majority parties in Israel, reflecting the ideological diversity within Arab society:

Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality):

Leader: Ayman Odeh
Current Knesset Seats: 4
Ideology: left-wing Arab-Jewish party that supports a two-state solution

Ta’al (Arab Movement for Renewal):

Leader: Ahmad Tibi
Current Knesset Seats: 2
Ideology: secular Arab nationalist party that supports a two-state solution

Ra’am (United Arab List):

Leader: Mansour Abbas
Current Knesset Seats: 5
Ideology: conservative Muslim Arab party and political wing of the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel

Balad (National Democratic Assembly):

Leader: Sami Abu Shehadeh
Current Knesset Seats: 0
Ideology: Palestinian nationalist party that supports creating a binational state

Ra’am prioritizes Arab Israeli communal issues, while the other Joint List parties are more focused on Palestinian national identity and ending the occupation. In the 2021 elections, Ra’am ran independently and ended up playing the role of kingmaker – joining the Bennett-Lapid coalition and securing unprecedented investment for the Arab community. The Joint List ran without Ra’am in the election that year, winning just six mandates. Further splintering in 2022 backfired severely when Balad broke off and fell just below the threshold, costing the Arabs – and the broader anti-Netanyahu bloc – several Knesset seats.

At its peak, the Joint List was the third-largest party in the Knesset, winning 15 parliamentary seats in the 2020 election. Arab Israeli turnout reached a peak of nearly 65 percent in 2020, with 88 percent of Arab voters having voted for Arab parties that year. Due to increased disaffection with national politics among Arab Israelis, combined with family and clan-based dynamics, Arab voter turnout in municipal elections traditionally exceeds national turnout. This divide reflects growing feelings of marginalization, political exclusion, and doubt about the effectiveness of parliamentary representation in a system that views Arab citizens as second-class.

Joint List Revival Ahead of the 2026 Election

On January 22, the leaders of the four Arab parties signed an agreement reviving the Joint List. Ahead of the 2026 Israeli election, Odeh, Tibi, Abbas, and Abu Shehadeh gathered in Sakhnin amid the general strike and set aside their differences for the sake of Arab electoral unity. This move was less an expression of profound ideological consensus than a direct response to unprecedented public pressure that reshaped political priorities. Following the signing of the unity agreement, the leaders of the Arab parties emphasized that the new incarnation of the Joint List is not a full party merger, but rather a technical electoral alliance aimed at running in the upcoming election as a single list. This alliance respects the ideological and political differences among its constituent parties and does not obligate any party to specific political positions after the election.

82 percent of Arab Israelis support a united Joint List; the new agreement, which harnesses the momentum of the protest movement, is likely to boost Arab voter turnout in the 2026 election. A unified list, as opposed to a splintering of Arab parties, signals to Arab citizens that their vote will actually have an impact.

According to the latest polling, the Joint List could win 15 seats or more, and again become the third-largest party in the Knesset. This would preclude Netanyahu and the opposition from forming a 61-seat majority governing coalition without the support of the Arab parties. Hence, the Joint List could play a decisive role in the upcoming election and, if the Zionist opposition cooperates, the Arab parties could help defeat Netanyahu. After the election, to be held by October 27, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett – who is running to replace Netanyahu – will almost certainly have to choose between some form of Arab-Jewish partnership or joining Netanyahu.

Prospects for Arab-Jewish Political Partnership

In 2021, Abbas made history as the first Arab political leader to join an Israeli governing coalition. He served as minister without portfolio in the Bennett-Lapid government (June 2021 - December 2022), securing an unprecedented multibillion-dollar budget for the Arab community and the authorization of some unrecognized Bedouin villages in the southern Negev. The “government of change” also had two other Arab ministers, Issawi Frej of Meretz (Minister for Regional Cooperation) and Hamad Amar of Yisrael Beiteinu (Minister in the Finance Ministry).

In addition, Meretz and Labor were members of the Bennett-Lapid coalition and both parties had some Arab representation: Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi (co-author of this J Street Policy Center issue brief) was the second Arab MK from Meretz and Ibtisam Mara’ana was the one Arab MK from Labor. While the “government of change” was short-lived, it provided a glimmer of hope for Arab-Jewish political partnership in Israel. Arab ministers partnered with Prime Minister Bennett, a former director of the West Bank (Yesha) settler council, and together produced both symbolic and tangible outcomes for the betterment of Arabs and Jews alike.

Ahead of the 2026 election, there have been efforts to forge Arab-Jewish political partnerships, with some in the “Standing Together” movement contemplating a shift from grassroots advocacy to direct electoral participation. Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas has endeavored to boost his party’s legitimacy within Jewish society by separating the party from the Islamic Movement’s Shura Council and welcoming Jewish candidates. Shamefully, Bennett has vowed that unlike last time, he would not include Arab parties in his coalition. Blue and White party leader, Benny Gantz, has made the same racist pledge, despite a willingness by Joint List chairman Ayman Odeh to join forces with Gantz back in 2019.

The prospect of Arab-Jewish partnership in a Bennett-led government has been met with racist incitement by Netanyahu and his allies. Last month, the prime minister accused Bennett of seeking to form a government with the “Muslim Brotherhood.” Netanyahu’s Likud party was ordered by the Central Elections Committee to remove from its social media a doctored image depicting Bennett alongside the Joint List party leaders. In another racist display, Itamar Ben-Gvir posted the original image of the four Arab leaders with the caption, “Alliance of Terrorist Representatives” – using the acronym בנ”ט which also spells out Bennett.

Given the post-October 7 political climate, an Arab-Jewish party is unlikely to succeed in the upcoming election, but a post-election governing coalition of Jews and Arabs could. More than 75 percent of Arab citizens support an Arab-Jewish coalition. If the Zionist opposition led by Bennett dispenses with racist anti-Arab pledges and cooperates with the Joint List, Arab-Jewish political partnership could potentially bring down Netanyahu once and for all.

Resolving Arab-Jewish Disparities

In order to resolve the disparities between Arabs and Jews in Israel, incitement against Arab Israelis and their political persecution must end; Arab citizens must be able to vote in the 2026 election without discrimination or concern for their safety; Jewish political leaders must immediately stop campaigning against Arab participation in the next coalition; and the next Israeli government must (1) include Arab representation, (2) urgently restore security to Arab communities, and (3) rescind budget cuts and increase funding for Arab Israelis.

To keep the pressure up, Arabs and their Jewish allies should continue to protest against the Netanyahu government and participate in strategic economic strikes. More of the Arabic-language protest movement materials should be translated into Hebrew in order to sustain and expand Jewish allyship. Ultimately, however, the responsibility for protecting Arab Israelis rests with the government; weapons smuggling across Israel’s borders and theft of arms from IDF bases are the prerogatives of the state and police. The Arab community needs state backing to prevent the flow of weapons and disarm those who possess them. For Israel to live up to its founding egalitarian principles and democratic values, Arab citizens must be protected, represented, and fully integrated into the Israeli political process.

What to Watch When Netanyahu Meets Trump Tomorrow

frank lowenstein — Tue, 10 Feb 2026 21:59:29 GMT

On Wednesday, February 10, Prime Minister Netanyahu will meet with President Trump, his seventh White House visit since Trump took office last January. Netanyahu reportedly requested the meeting this week to ensure that the Israeli position is clear before the next round of negotiations between the US and Iran is held next week.

These talks are taking place as Trump has deployed a “massive armada” to the region, including the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. Trump has repeatedly threatened to launch another round of strikes against Iran if negotiations fail, saying today (February 10, 2026): “Either we will make a deal, or we will have to do something very tough like last time.” For its part, Iran has threatened a harsh response if attacked that could target US allies and bases, potentially triggering a regional war.

The meeting agenda will also include Gaza, including Trump’s plan to convene the first meeting of the Board of Peace while moving forward with the implementation of Phase II of the Gaza ceasefire agreement.

Below is a summary of the key issues and what to watch for in the meeting:

US-Iran Negotiations

The US and Iran held the first talks of a new round of negotiations in Oman last Friday (February 6, 2026), with a goal of reaching an agreement that would preclude US military action. Trump described the initial discussions as “very good,” saying Iran “wants a deal very badly.”

The regime in Iran has never been weaker, and they have expressed a strong desire to continue negotiations to forestall military strikes that could further endanger its survival. However, its leaders have made clear that they will not give up the right to uranium enrichment, which they described as a “non-negotiable.” They have also pushed back on any negotiations over their ballistic missile program, which they claim is necessary for national defense, or their support for proxies.

Secretary of State Rubio initially said the US wanted the negotiations to include ballistic missiles, proxies and treatment of protesters, but ultimately agreed to a narrower agenda at Iran’s insistence. Trump has made clear that the primary focus will be on the nuclear issue, while suggesting it may be possible to address Iran’s ballistic missile program as well.

Iran is reportedly open to negotiations on a long-term freeze of its nuclear enrichment program in exchange for sanctions relief, and may be willing to hand over the 400kg of highly enriched uranium still inside the country and allow inspectors back in. This could allow Trump to claim that he got a “better deal” than Obama did in 2015.

Netanyahu’s Position

Reports from Israel suggest that Netanyahu will push for significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, the removal of enriched uranium from Iranian territory, and the imposition of limits on Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. While it is unclear whether Netanyahu will insist on a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, it is likely that his position will go beyond what Iran would accept. He will also likely take a hard line on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including limiting their range to 500km so they cannot reach Israel, which Iran will also almost certainly continue to reject.

Netanyahu reportedly wants to convince Trump to carry out his threat to attack Iran if they do not meet the very high bar the prime minister has set for negotiations. While Netanyahu encouraged Trump to hold off on military action last month, when Trump was seriously considering it, to allow more time for deployment of US assets to respond to a potential Iranian counterattack, he apparently no longer has those concerns. More broadly, he may see US military strikes as further weakening the regime and advancing his long-term goal of regime change.

Trump reportedly continues to have reservations about what military strikes would achieve, especially given the risk that Iran’s response would likely trigger a regional war that would have severe economic consequences for the region and beyond. He has been hearing from regional allies that negotiations are far preferable to highly destabilizing military action, but may feel compelled to follow through on his threats if negotiations fail.

Key Questions to Watch For:

Does Trump stake out a maximalist position on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, or does he leave the door open for a more limited agreement?
Does Trump insist that negotiations include Iran’s ballistic missiles, support for proxies, and treatment of protesters?
Does Trump place any public deadline on negotiations?
Does Netanyahu say that any deal must permanently end Iran’s nuclear enrichment program?
Do public comments by Netanyahu and Trump reveal any gaps between their positions on these issues?
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Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

While the focus of the Trump-Netanyahu meeting is Iran, they will also discuss Trump’s desire to move ahead with the implementation of Phase II of the Gaza ceasefire agreement. Trump plans to convene the first meeting of the Board of Peace next week, amid reports that Indonesia has become the first country to commit to providing troops to the International Stabilization Force.

However, Netanyahu has serious reservations about key aspects of the ceasefire plan, which falls short of his stated goal of “complete victory” in Gaza and may cause political problems with extremists in his coalition in advance of elections to be held later this year. To date, Israel has been slow-rolling the implementation of its obligations, including opening the Rafah crossing, while continuing to conduct strikes on Hamas targets in Gaza that have killed over 500 people since the ceasefire began.

In particular, Netanyahu has insisted that proceeding with Phase II, including reconstruction efforts, should be contingent on Hamas first completely disarming. While Hamas has suggested a willingness to decommission offensive weapons that could target Israel, it has refused to give up its small arms for the foreseeable future. The Trump Administration has given mixed messages on the question of Hamas disarming, including scope and timing, but it remains clear that Trump is personally invested enough in the agreement’s success that he is unlikely to greenlight a return to full-scale war.

Key Questions to Watch For:

Does Trump take a hard line on Hamas completely disarming before Phase II can proceed? Does he set any deadline for Hamas to comply?
Does Netanyahu continue to publicly insist on complete disarmament, or does he soften his tone?
Does Trump publicly confirm Indonesia’s reported willingness to send thousands of troops to Gaza as part of the ISF? Does he mention any other states’ commitments? Does he talk about the ISF’s mandate?
Does Trump provide any further clarity on the Board of Peace’s role, signaling a clear commitment to moving ahead with Phase II?
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Qatargate: Explaining Israel's Wartime Foreign Influence Scandal

Yael Patir — Thu, 05 Feb 2026 18:51:21 GMT

Last month, Israeli police concluded their investigation into Qatargate, a scandal involving allegations that Qatar bribed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s top aides to promote Qatari interests during the Gaza war. The State Attorney’s Office is now considering whether to indict members of Netanyahu’s inner circle. While the prime minister himself is not a suspect, Israeli public opinion is deeply divided over whether Netanyahu was aware of or complicit in Qatar’s alleged influence inside his office, with a slim majority believing that he was.

The prime minister has sought to distance himself from the scandal. At a recent press conference, Netanyahu said in reference to one of his closest advisors and a leading suspect: “He never said a word to me about Qatar … it’s all fiction.” Qatargate is not merely another Netanyahu corruption scandal, but a wartime foreign influence campaign that exposed structural vulnerabilities in Israel’s government and major threats to national security. This issue brief explains the affair and its implications for the country’s politics and public opinion.

What Is Qatargate?

Qatargate concerns allegations that lobbyists acting on behalf of Qatar paid senior Netanyahu advisors to spread pro-Qatari messaging in an effort to elevate the Gulf state’s image as a mediator in the hostage negotiations. Importantly, inside Israel, Qatar is widely regarded as hostile and known for hosting and sponsoring Hamas. In contrast, both the Trump Administration and previous US Administrations have viewed Qatar as a partner who can play a mediating role with Hamas. Qatar has in the past also played a role in mediating with other actors, such as the Taliban, and also hosts a key US airbase.

The case centers on three figures closely linked to Netanyahu who are suspected of having received funds from a pro-Qatar lobbying firm:

Jonatan Urich, a senior adviser and campaign strategist who has worked closely with Netanyahu since 2015.
Israel (“Srulik”) Einhorn, a political consultant who, along with Urich, led five Likud election campaigns from 2019 until 2022.
Eli Feldstein, Netanyahu’s former military spokesperson. Feldstein was hired shortly after the October 7 attack as a liaison between the Prime Minister’s Office and Israeli military correspondents – a line of communication designed to bypass the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit and, according to investigators, promote messaging more closely aligned with Netanyahu’s political interests.

The Qatari influence campaign aimed to bolster Qatar’s standing – while minimizing Egypt’s role – as the leading mediator between Israel and Hamas during the Gaza war. Urich and Feldstein were arrested in connection with Qatargate in April 2025. Since then, courts have barred Urich from communicating with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and Netanyahu himself. The police investigation concluded in January 2026, and the case now awaits prosecutorial determination of whether Israel’s national security was harmed.

How was Qatari money funneled to Netanyahu’s advisers?

According to investigative reporting, Qatari funds were routed through a network of foreign entities before reaching Israeli political and communications firms linked to Netanyahu’s advisers. Einhorn constructed a two-pronged campaign aimed at the Israeli public:

One channel operated through Feldstein and Israeli journalists, some of whom later testified that they received messaging favorable to Qatar and critical of Egypt in the context of hostage negotiations.
The second channel, led by US-based lobbyist Jay Footlik, relied on online amplification portraying Qatar as the most effective mediator. Feldstein’s salary was allegedly paid by Footlik via Israeli businessman Gil Birger.

In multiple instances, Israeli journalists appear to have passed on Feldstein’s information and framing with minimal verification, effectively amplifying foreign-sponsored narratives during wartime. This blow to the credibility of Israeli journalism erodes a central democratic firewall meant to protect against government abuses.

The Bild Case and its Connection to Qatargate

Qatargate is connected to another case that Feldstein has been indicted for, concerning the alleged leak of classified intelligence material to the German newspaper, Bild. The leaked document suggested the Israeli public’s pressure on the Israeli government to bring back the hostages was part of Hamas’s negotiating strategy. The timing of the leak – following the August 2024 Hamas killing of six Israeli hostages in a Rafah tunnel – suggests it was an effort to shape Israeli public opinion by deflecting blame for the hostages’ death away from Netanyahu and toward Hamas and the Israeli Hostages and Missing Families Forum. Crucially, the Bild leak actually led Israeli legal authorities to uncover the Qatar-linked influence campaign within the PMO, as it involved several of the same actors.

In November 2024, the Central District State Attorney’s Office filed an indictment against Feldstein, charging him with serious security offenses, including unlawful disclosure of classified information, unauthorized possession of classified material, and obstruction of justice. An arrest warrant was also issued against Einhorn in early 2025; Einhorn lives in Belgrade and serves as a political consultant to the Serbian government. He has remained outside Israel and has been described by Israeli police as a fugitive. Meanwhile, Urich’s involvement in the Bild leak is still under review.

The Implications of Qatargate

Wartime Decisionmaking: After the October 7 attack, Israel faced a strategic decision over which actor, Qatar or Egypt, should play the leading role in negotiations with Hamas. Within the security establishment, assessments diverged, and the prime minister ultimately opted for Qatar. At the same time, Israeli public discourse became saturated with unfounded claims portraying Egypt as an emerging security threat. Senior Israeli security officials repeatedly sought to clarify that no deterioration had occurred in Israel-Egypt relations. The persistence of this narrative alongside the mediation debate raises the concern that the Israeli government made a major wartime decision under Qatari pressure, thereby threatening Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt, a cornerstone of Israeli national security.
Security: Feldstein traveled with Netanyahu, attended sensitive meetings, and interacted with military correspondents, despite having failed to obtain Shin Bet security clearance.
Intelligence: Sensitive materials were transmitted from Israeli intelligence to a political aide lacking full clearance – a significant failure.
Electoral Politics: Ahead of the 2026 Israeli election, opposition figures – most notably former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett – have begun raising concerns about Qatargate. The scandal will likely be a feature of the upcoming election and a political liability for Netanyahu’s re-election campaign, but is unlikely to dramatically affect the outcome.
Public Opinion: Polling underscores the partisan divide regarding Qatargate, with many voters treating the affair as further confirmation of what they already believe about Netanyahu and the investigations into him. 54 percent of Israelis believe Netanyahu was aware of his advisers’ ties to Qatar, while 26.5 percent believe he was not. The former camp is composed mostly of centrist and left-wing voters, while the latter camp is composed mostly of right-wing voters loyal to Netanyahu.

Conclusion

Qatargate is especially sensitive given Qatar’s indispensable role in the past and future of Gaza. Before October 7, Netanyahu long maintained a policy of allowing Qatari funds into Gaza. This policy was based on flawed thinking that keeping the West Bank and Gaza divided and propping up Hamas would effectively “manage” the conflict, weaken the Palestinian Authority, and prevent Palestinian statehood. While that policy was openly debated and coordinated with international actors, Qatargate suggests that Israeli government engagement with Qatar may have extended beyond official channels.

Ultimately, Qatargate points to a longer-term, gradual weakening of institutional and legal guardrails over the past decade, a process that has reshaped how power is exercised at the core of the Israeli government. Whether or not indictments are ultimately filed, Qatargate has already become a defining episode in Israel’s ongoing struggle and deep polarization over accountability, governance, and national security.

Explained: Israel's Deregistration of International Aid Organizations

Larry Garber — Thu, 22 Jan 2026 21:13:38 GMT

The humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has improved significantly since the October ceasefire, but challenges remain. The massive destruction of critical infrastructure and agricultural production, alongside two years of limited access to food, water, and medicine, will affect Gaza’s population for years to come. Among the notable humanitarian challenges facing Gaza’s civilians are the following:

The denial of registration to international NGOs that provide life-saving services inside Gaza
Restrictions on the import of goods necessary for adequate shelter, and
Additional operational restrictions that have been imposed on UNRWA, the largest provider of services to the population.

Why is Israel deregistering international NGOs in Gaza?

In March 2025, Israel introduced new registration requirements for international NGOs (INGOs) and transferred authority over the registration process to the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, which has taken a hardline stance towards INGOs. The new rules require INGOs to provide sensitive personal data on Palestinian staff to the Israeli government, including names, ID numbers, and, in some cases, residential addresses. Israel argues this information is necessary to ensure aid organizations are not infiltrated by Hamas or other militant groups. The requirements also authorize the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to deny registration to any INGO deemed to be “delegitimizing” the state of Israel – referring to ideological criticisms of Israel, such as the accusation of genocide or deliberate use of siege tactics, or expressions of support for legal proceedings against Israelis in foreign or international courts.

In late December 2025, the Israeli government began enforcing the new requirements, approving the registration of 24 INGOs, mostly faith-based organizations, while informing 37 non-compliant INGOs – including such major humanitarian actors as Doctors Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, and Mercy Corps – that their authorization to operate in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem had expired, and that they must cease their operations by March 1, 2026 unless they comply with the new terms. Several other organizations, including Save the Children, had their applications formally rejected but continue to operate in Gaza.

According to the Israeli government, the 37 non-compliant INGOs failed to complete their applications by refusing to submit complete lists of their Palestinian employees. Most INGOs have objected to this requirement, noting several key objections:

Israel has not articulated the specific purposes for which the staff lists will be used. In a conflict in which over 500 humanitarian workers have been killed, the INGOs believe that handing over their staff lists without agreed-upon parameters for their use would violate their duty of care to their local staff. The INGOs propose that Israel commit to notifying them of any adverse information regarding an employee, which would allow the INGO to dismiss the employee, rather than using the information to target the individual or members of their family.
Out of thousands of INGO employees in Gaza, Israel has accused only a handful of militant ties – for example, just two out of Doctors Without Borders’ 1,000 Gaza staff – and has not substantiated claims of systematic infiltration that would compromise humanitarian operations. In fact, the INGOs assert that due to the humanitarian principle of neutrality, if militants ever tried to infiltrate or co-opt their operations, they would be immediately dismissed.
Many of the large international NGOs already have their own extensive vetting processes, as they appreciate the operational and reputational consequences of hiring individuals affiliated with militant groups.
The requirement to provide lists of Palestinian employees is not being uniformly applied, as several approved INGOs were only asked to provide information about senior Palestinian employees.

Some international organizations have sought to work out compromises with the Israeli authorities, seeking to limit the number of employees for whom personal information is provided and to outline an explicitly defined vetting process, or to rely on third-party vetting and the establishment of donor-audited compliance mechanisms. Doctors Without Borders, for instance, has offered to share a defined list of some of their Palestinian staff, subject to clear parameters that protect their safety. While the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs welcomed Doctors Without Borders’ announcement, it also stated that the full transfer of employee information was required and indicated that Israel was not open to negotiating the previously announced requirements.

What will be the impact of deregistering these INGOs?

The Israeli government is refusing to make any adjustments to its requirements and is seeking to minimize the negative consequences of the deregistration by propagating two myths:

Myth #1: The services provided by INGOs are negligible, as they only bring one percent of aid into Gaza, and so their ceasing to operate will not have a significant impact on the ground.

Reality: INGOs deliver and provide a substantial share of life-saving aid inside Gaza, including:

The delivery of more than half of food aid
Supporting 60 percent of field hospitals
Providing nearly 75 percent of shelter assistance
Providing all treatment for children with severe acute malnutrition.

Once an aid truck enters Gaza, the contents need to be delivered to a warehouse or distribution point, and humanitarian services themselves must be provided to the most vulnerable populations. The delivery and provision of humanitarian aid requires specialized and technical personnel, as well as deep community trust and integration, which INGOs and their personnel have built up over many years. For example, Doctors Without Borders is the second largest medical provider in the Strip, running or supporting over 20 percent of the remaining hospital beds in Gaza, and delivering one in three childbirths. Forcing these organizations to cease their operations, therefore, will worsen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza severely.

Myth #2: The services provided by the INGOs can be readily replaced by private contractors.

Reality: Replacing humanitarian organizations with private contractors was the logic behind the failed effort of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which resulted in hundreds of Palestinian civilian casualties and was ultimately scrapped once the ceasefire went into effect. In a complex security environment such as Gaza, where the population so desperately needs humanitarian relief at scale across multiple sectors, providing aid requires technical expertise, local relationships based on trust and community acceptance, and a public perception of neutrality.

The 37 affected organizations are currently reviewing their legal options, seeking diplomatic support (including from the US), and developing contingency plans for maintaining operations to the extent possible after March 1, even without registration. However, such efforts would be complicated and perhaps impossible as the organizations would lose access to functions that are crucial for their services, including:

Deconfliction channels with the Israelis that allow them to operate safely inside Gaza
Transferring goods into Gaza through Israeli-controlled border crossings
Obtaining visas for their foreign staff who seek to enter Gaza (or even the West Bank)
Transferring funds to local staff for salary and to purchase goods in local markets (given Israel’s ability to cut off bank transfers through Palestinian banks)
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Is enough aid entering Gaza? If yes, then why are things still so bad?

Since the October 11, 2025, ceasefire, the quantity of goods entering the Gaza Strip has increased dramatically. According to the United Nations monitoring mechanism, the average number of trucks entering Gaza has increased at least threefold compared to the period before the ceasefire. Food trucks account for two-thirds of the commodities transferred into Gaza during the post-ceasefire period, with trucks carrying shelter and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) accounting for most of the rest.

The January 2 UN Gaza Humanitarian Response Report states that for the first time since October 2023, food assistance has been meeting 100 percent of caloric needs for Gaza’s population. As a result, concerns about widespread famine have diminished. Still, there are pockets of food insecurity in sections of the Strip, particularly for the most vulnerable. Notably, the consequences of the reduced food intake over an extended period of time will take months if not years to reverse.

Despite significant improvements in food security and the quantity of aid entering, there have been significant challenges in ensuring the entry of other forms of essential aid:

Fuel, which is essential for electric power and to run major infrastructure installations (e.g., desalination and waste treatment plants), is in short supply and expensive.
Medicines for the treatment of chronic diseases are also not readily available for those who need them on a regular basis.
Most problematic is the lack of adequate shelter. Close to two million people remain displaced, living in tent cities across the Strip. Israeli restrictions on “dual-use” items mean that the metal rods required to build tents that can withstand storm conditions are not allowed into the Strip. As a result, tents have failed to protect refugees from flooding on multiple occasions, resulting in at least 20 Palestinians dying from drowning and extreme cold since the ceasefire started.

What is the impact of the new anti-UNRWA legislation on Gaza and the West Bank?

Israel’s continued assault on UNRWA’s ability to operate in Gaza and the West Bank has included:

A ban on UNRWA from operating in Israeli territory,
Prohibiting Israeli authorities from having any contact with the agency, and
Legislation prohibiting the provision of electricity or water to facilities owned by or operated on behalf of UNRWA.

Despite the existing legal obstacles, UNRWA continues to operate.

It employs more than 15,000 Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank,
Remains the largest provider of health and education services in Gaza, and
Maintains active programs throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

UNRWA believes that the legislation applies only to territory Israel defines as sovereign, so while it will most certainly impact its operations in East Jerusalem – already resulting in the demolition of its headquarters and the likely further closure of offices and schools – its impact in Gaza and the West Bank is less clear.

In December 2025, the United Nations renewed UNRWA’s mandate for the next three years, with the overwhelming majority of member states voting in favor of the renewal. However, the organization is facing a severe financial crunch; on January 5, 2026, it announced the dismissal of 571 employees in Gaza, and additional cuts are anticipated.

What is going on with the Rafah crossing?

The Rafah crossing served as a transit point between Gaza and Egypt until October 2023. Following October 7, access through Rafah was highly restricted, and the Israeli military seized the crossing in May 2024. Since then, except for a short period during the early 2025 ceasefire, neither people nor goods have been able to cross through Rafah.

Nickolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace’s High Representative for Gaza, has announced that the crossing will open next week, as per Point 8 of the October ceasefire plan. This remains subject to approval by hardliners in Israel’s security cabinet, and it remains unclear what the monitoring protocol will be for the crossing.

Still, opening the crossing is likely to allow for some relief, including:

Allowing many Palestinians to leave Gaza, while also enabling some who have been stuck outside of Gaza since October 7 to return.
The entry of UN and INGO international staff who are prohibited from entering through Israel.

Despite this relief, if Israel continues to insist that humanitarian goods enter only through Israeli crossings (primarily nearby Kerem Shalom), the opening of the crossing by itself will not dramatically transform the humanitarian situation.

Progress and Challenges on Israel's Northern Borders: Lebanon and Syria in 2026

Jen Gavito — Fri, 16 Jan 2026 19:24:01 GMT

2026 promises to be a year of considerable transition and transformation – again – in the Levant. After decades of troubled relations along the Lebanese and Syrian borders, unfolding developments, carefully managed, could offer Israel an unprecedented opportunity for improved relationships with these key neighbors and fundamentally improve its long-term security and stability. While true normalization remains off on the horizon, this year could mark initial steps towards greater joint prosperity for all parties – or be looked back upon as a tragically missed opportunity should the US administration, Congress, and Israel not work closely together to build upon progress to date.

LEBANON

Hezbollah’s Disarmament

Last year, Lebanon elected a new president and prime minister who have publicly committed to disarming Hezbollah and reasserting the state monopoly on weapons. The new Lebanese leadership has pledged to abide by the Hezbollah disarmament provisions of the 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (which ended the 2006 Lebanon War).

Consistent with this pledge, the Lebanese government in August 2025 adopted the “National Shield” (Dir al-Watan) plan, a five-phase roadmap to disarm Hezbollah – informed by an earlier US proposal. While Hezbollah swiftly rejected the plan, citing Israeli violations of the ceasefire, the Lebanese government and military have moved ahead with implementation. In October 2025, the Trump Administration approved $230 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in support of these efforts.

The LAF has successfully cleared numerous Hezbollah tunnels, rocket-launching sites, and other fortified positions south of the Litani River. It has removed approximately 10,000 rockets, 400 missiles, and 205,000 unexploded ordnance fragments.
On January 8, 2026, the LAF announced the completion of the first phase of the roadmap and claimed that it now has “operational control” south of Litani – except for territory that remains occupied by the Israeli military.
The Lebanese military acknowledged that Hezbollah has not yet been fully disarmed and that disarmament operations are still ongoing.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that the completion of phase one is an “encouraging beginning, but … far from sufficient,” claiming that Hezbollah continues to pose a threat and that the 2024 ceasefire requires full, not partial disarmament. Israel’s Foreign Ministry warned that Hezbollah, with Iranian support, is “rearming faster than it is being disarmed,” following the 2023-2024 conflict in which Israel severely degraded Hezbollah and eliminated its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Naim Qassem, who succeeded Nasrallah, maintains that Hezbollah no longer has an armed presence south of Litani, but that full disarmament is against Lebanese interests. The extent of Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon is uncertain, but the governments of the US, Israel, and Lebanon remain committed to disarmament throughout the country.

Israel-Lebanon Negotiations and Military Escalation

It was against this backdrop that Israel and Lebanon, in December 2025, held their first direct talks between civilian representatives of the two countries since 1983. The meetings, which took place at the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) headquarters in Naqoura under the auspices of the existing US-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism, represent a significant, although tenuous development; they expand the aperture of discussions beyond crisis talks between military and/or intelligence officials that have generally characterized direct talks between the two parties in recent decades.

The talks were conceived as conflict management rather than conflict resolution, and specifically aimed to reduce the risk of unintended escalation along the Israeli-Lebanese border. The civilian nature of the discussions is especially notable as it positions the Lebanese government as the responsible party rather than Hezbollah. Recent military escalations, including Israeli strikes against southern and eastern Lebanon this month, cross-border exchanges of fire, and continued Hezbollah activity, have narrowed the scope for these negotiations but have arguably increased their strategic importance.

Politically, the recent escalation hardens public positions on both sides, pushing any discussion of normalization or even normalized cooperation further down the road. Israel’s strikes against Lebanon also strengthen Hezbollah’s arguments against diplomacy under fire and constrain the ability of civilian representatives to make any concessions. For Israel, active hostilities reinforce skepticism within the Netanyahu government that the Lebanese state can deliver Hezbollah’s disarmament or control of the country’s southern border region.

SYRIA

Last month marked one year since the downfall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The new Syrian government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa has overseen both successes and failures during his first year in office, as he seeks to rebuild his country after more than a decade of civil war. President Al-Sharaa has achieved several diplomatic successes thus far:

Global Recognition: In September, he became the first Syrian president to address the United Nations General Assembly in six decades, and in November, Al-Sharaa became the first Syrian head of state in history to visit the White House.
Sanctions Relief: Back in May, President Trump and President Al-Sharaa met for the first time in Riyadh, at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin-Salman. The Syrian president successfully lobbied the American president for US sanctions relief to help rebuild Syria after the fall of Assad. Trump lifted most sanctions against Syria in June and ultimately removed all sanctions by repealing the Caesar Act in December. Sanctions against Syria were also lifted by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the European Union.
Economic/Humanitarian Aid: The new Syrian government has secured increased economic and humanitarian aid from the United States, United Kingdom, United Nations, European Union, and the Arab world – primarily from Saudi Arabia.

Counterterrorism

In year one, the Al-Sharaa government has taken strides toward countering terrorism and the resurgence of ISIS, but it still has much progress to make.

Military Integration: The new Syrian military has sought to integrate armed groups throughout the country and unify them under the Ministry of Defense, in order to recover state control of weapons and effectively combat terrorism. This unification process is still a work in progress and, as of this writing, Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are engaged in violent clashes over SDF integration.
Countering ISIS: Syria has joined the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. In the wake of an ISIS attack in December that killed two US soldiers in Syria, the Al-Sharaa government issued a swift condemnation and bolstered its counterterrorism efforts. In partnership with the Syrian military and other regional partners, US Central Command subsequently launched Operation Hawkeye Strike against ISIS in Syria, killing or capturing at least 25 ISIS operatives. President Trump later praised Al-Sharaa for being “with us all the way” during the operation.
Weapons and Illicit Drugs: The new Syrian government has also pledged to combat weapons and drug smuggling and destroy any remains of the chemical weapons program developed under the Assad regime.

In turn, the Trump Administration has revoked both the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the now-dissolved group formerly led by Al-Sharaa, and the Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation of the Syrian president. Similarly, the UN Security Council demonstrated confidence in the counterterrorism efforts of Al-Sharaa by lifting terror-related sanctions against him.

Syrian Minorities

Upon assuming power, Al-Sharaa pledged to protect all minority groups in Syria. During his one-year anniversary speech last month, he remade this pledge. Al-Sharaa has promised a transition to inclusive governance, minority representation, and political participation for Alawites, Druze, Bedouin, Kurds, Shia Muslims, Christians, among other minorities. His record thus far is mixed:

New Constitution: Syria’s new constitution has been criticized for failing to adequately protect minority rights.
Sectarian Violence: Several waves of sectarian violence in Syria last year resulted in mass death, particularly among the Alawite and Druze populations. More than 1,400 Alawites and 2,000 Druze were killed, including at the hands of Syrian government forces and its affiliates. War crimes, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses have been documented, while Al-Sharaa has reaffirmed his commitment to protect Alawites and Druze and promised to hold the perpetrators accountable.
Accountability: In November, Syria opened its first trial over the anti-Alawite violence, and in September, Syria adopted a roadmap for resolving the crisis in the Druze-majority Sweida. However, the Syrian president has insisted that “remnants” of the former Assad regime are largely responsible for the violence and that his government does not systematically target minorities.

Israel-Syria Talks and Military Entanglements

Similar to the Israel-Lebanon talks, recent US-brokered Israel-Syria discussions in Paris mark the most substantive direct engagement between the two countries in decades. While significant, these are not peace negotiations and are not currently envisaged to expand to normalization or even broader cooperation negotiations. Rather, they seek to provide a de-escalation channel and mechanisms to manage what remains a volatile border region.

The discussions simultaneously provide some degree of desired legitimacy to a new and still controversial Syrian regime, while giving Israel and the US increased leverage over the Al-Sharaa government. They also establish a much-needed channel through which to organize security arrangements palatable to Israel that limit the potential for Iran and its proxies to reassert a presence along its border or in the Golan Heights. However, the inability of the Syrian government to exert control over the disparate armed groups operating in its territory remains problematic and will for now limit the utility of any agreements reached through these negotiations.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

J Street remains committed to negotiated settlements with Israel’s neighbors as its only sustainable path to long-term peace and security, as well as a necessary foundation for a comprehensive 23-State Solution. Recent US-brokered direct talks between Israel and Syria and Lebanon represent an important step toward that goal. However, security instability between the parties is constraining progress and undermines the significant opportunities these negotiations represent. To ensure their viability, we recommend the following:

The Trump Administration should put forward concrete policy proposals, including for demilitarized zones and joint civilian coordination committees, and use its influence to secure the parties’ commitments to their implementation.
- The administration should also integrate additional international partners into the effort, unifying any efforts being undertaken by multilateral parties such as the UN, EU, or Gulf Cooperation Council to prevent conflicting outcomes.

The US Congress should continue to provide support both via policy and appropriations assistance programs, including for the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, that help anchor these negotiations.
- At the same time, Congress can help preserve long-term US leverage by conditioning and incentivizing economic and security assistance on quantifiable benchmarks and outcomes.

Israel must be accepted as a reliable and trustworthy negotiating partner in order for these talks to ultimately broaden in scope and depth, opening the door to greater regional cooperation. To achieve that, Israel should prioritize phased confidence-building measures that incrementally build trust with Syria and Lebanon.
- Israel should communicate clear benchmarks and expectations, and then support the provision of necessary resources and technical support for the respective governments of Syria and Lebanon to achieve them. Violations of the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon or incursions into sovereign Syrian territory should be avoided to every extent possible. Instead, the Israeli government should empower the Syrian and Lebanese governments to effectively resolve legitimate threats to Israel’s security.

Netanyahu's Pardon Gamble and What It Means For Israeli Democracy

Yael Patir — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 14:55:01 GMT

On November 30, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu submitted a 111-page request for a presidential pardon to President Isaac Herzog – five and a half years after his trial began, and just weeks after Donald Trump personally urged Herzog, in the Knesset and in writing on White House letterhead, to “fully” pardon him.

The request is unprecedented in modern Israeli history: a sitting prime minister on trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust asking for an end to legal proceedings without an admission of guilt, without expressing remorse, and without any commitment to retire from political life.

Netanyahu’s Framing

Netanyahu’s letter is carefully crafted. Rather than presenting himself as a defendant seeking mercy, he casts himself as a statesman sacrificing his personal interest for the good of the nation. Netanyahu argues that the criminal proceedings against him “harm Israel’s national interests, inflame divisions among the people, and divert attention from urgent security and diplomatic challenges.” It highlights his record on Iran, the economy, and foreign policy. Crucially, Netanyahu does not admit any wrongdoing and reiterates his confidence in a full acquittal.

Trump’s Intervention

Netanyahu’s move cannot be separated from Donald Trump’s intervention. In October, Trump stood at the Knesset podium and publicly called on Herzog to pardon Netanyahu. In mid-November, he followed up with an official letter to the president, denouncing the trial as “political lawfare” and urging a full pardon. Trump has described his own political troubles in the same terms – as a deep state conspiracy. This parallel reflects more than personal loyalty between Trump and Netanyahu; it is a shared political project that seeks to delegitimize independent legal institutions as enemies of the people.

Netanyahu’s “Win-Win” Political Trap

Domestically, the pardon request is a classic Netanyahu maneuver: whichever way the system turns, he wins. If Herzog and the legal establishment move toward some form of clemency, Netanyahu can present it as national reconciliation and use it to reshape the political map – perhaps by assembling a unity government, moderating his coalition, and rehabilitating his image as a unifier after years of polarization. Voters who traditionally do not vote for Netanyahu may be tempted to do so for the sake of ending this saga. If, on the other hand, the president and the courts reject the request, Netanyahu still wins politically. He can tell his base: “I was ready to compromise for the sake of unity; they refused.” That narrative would deepen mistrust of the judiciary and energize Netanyahu’s loyal base of support.

When asked directly whether he would retire if he received a pardon, Netanyahu answered simply: “No.” In other words: no admission of guilt, no exit from public life, and no real accountability. The timing of the request is also strategic: with elections approaching, demands for an October 7 inquiry, economic strains, and diplomatic setbacks, the pardon request pushes these vulnerabilities off the agenda. It becomes a powerful distraction tool. And whichever way it goes, Netanyahu wins. If granted, he gains legitimacy; if denied, he can frame it as proof of a “rigged” system.

Knesset Reactions

The opposition’s leaders, including Yair Lapid, Yair Golan, Naftali Bennett, and Gadi Eisenkot all publicly insist that any pardon be conditioned on three elements: admission of wrongdoing, expression of remorse, and immediate retirement from political life – essentially, a structured exit that prioritizes the rule of law and restores minimal accountability.

Within Netanyahu’s coalition, the message is very different. Government ministers praised Netanyahu’s move as an act of “national responsibility,” called on Herzog to “end the Netanyahu trial saga,” and explicitly linked the pardon to “healing divisions” and moving forward with the government’s agenda. Echoing the language of Netanyahu’s pardon appeal, they also stressed their belief that the trial is hindering Netanyahu’s ability to handle matters of significant national consequence.

What does the Israeli public think?

The Israel Democracy Institute’s poll demonstrates a highly divided society and the absence of a clear public mandate for an unconditional pardon. According to the survey, 50% of the public opposes granting a pardon that would halt Netanyahu’s trial. Support for the pardon is concentrated overwhelmingly among right-wing voters – a majority of whom favor pardoning the prime minister.

A pardon that is conditional on Netanyahu’s retirement from politics yields slightly greater support, with no clear plurality in favor or against. These polls thus reflect not only polarization along political lines, but also widespread fatigue. Many Israelis, including some who oppose Netanyahu, appear torn between concerns over equality before the law and a desire to bring the prolonged legal and political crisis to an end – a tension Netanyahu is eager to exploit.

Is it legal for the president to grant the prime minister a pardon?

Per Israeli Basic Law, the president is authorized to grant pardons and to commute or reduce sentences for “offenders,” with the custom being that pardons occur only after conviction. The only major exception was then-President Chaim Herzog’s pre-conviction pardon of senior Shin Bet officials implicated in the 1986 killing of two captured Palestinian hijackers – an exception he made to avoid state secrets being released in a trial. Crucially, however, the officials admitted guilt in their pardon request, and the pardon decision required the implicated Head of the Shin Bet to resign immediately.

Netanyahu, by contrast, is seeking a pre-conviction pardon and refuses to admit guilt, meaning he wants a pardon without being an “offender.” This has no legal precedent, as the Basic Law speaks only of pardoning offenders. A minority legal opinion espoused by Netanyahu’s team is that, for cases of significant public interest, the president can grant a pardon, regardless of the status of the defendant as an offender. Meanwhile, former Justice Ministry officials have stated plainly that there is no legal mechanism for a mid-trial presidential pardon that simply stops the proceedings. Only a court verdict, a plea bargain, or a decision by the attorney general to halt the prosecution can do that. There is also an outstanding legal question surrounding the fate of Netanyahu’s co-defendants if the prime minister is pardoned.

Four scenarios for what could happen next:

Herzog declines to act while the trial is ongoing: He could simply reaffirm the long-standing practice of the president not to intervene before the courts and prosecutors have completed their work. This would preserve institutional norms, but would also keep Israel locked in the same exhausting political-legal stalemate.
Compromise is achieved: Behind the scenes, Herzog or others could push for a plea bargain that includes reduced charges, no prison time or a symbolic sentence, and a presidential commutation combined with Netanyahu’s formal exit from political life. This is the only path that offers both accountability and closure, but it requires Netanyahu to accept responsibility – something he has consistently refused to do.
The coalition tries to change the rules mid-game: One dangerous scenario is a legislative push to shield a sitting prime minister from prosecution. This would almost certainly be challenged in the High Court and test the limits of Israel’s democratic institutions.
Herzog grants Netanyahu a pardon: Another dangerous scenario is that the president succumbs to all the pressure and grants the prime minister a pardon, without requiring him to admit guilt or retire from politics. Even if such a pardon is framed as a compromise, unless it includes an admission of guilt and Netanyahu stepping away from politics, it would deal a heavy and perhaps existential blow to Israeli democracy and the rule of law.

Israeli Democracy in the Balance

Former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak recently offered a diagnosis that helps explain why the current moment is so consequential. Speaking at a public event, he warned that Israel is no longer the democracy it once was and described what he called a strategy of “flooding,” whereby “defenders of democracy build a dam to plug a hole, but there are countless holes… ultimately exhausting the public and the gatekeepers’ ability to protect democracy.”

Barak’s description captures the dynamic at the heart of Netanyahu’s pardon request. The issue is not a single legal decision, but a cumulative process in which repeated institutional pressures – on the courts, law enforcement, the media, and now the presidency – wear down the system’s capacity to enforce limits on power. Each controversy can be framed as technical, temporary, or pragmatic; together, they amount to structural erosion.

As long as Netanyahu remains in office, this pressure is unlikely to abate. His personal legal predicament has become inseparable from the functioning of the state, ensuring that every institutional actor is drawn into a cycle of crisis management rather than principled governance. In this context, President Isaac Herzog holds a pivotal role: he can either reinforce the dam or, by intervening in a way that blurs accountability, widen the breach.

That responsibility is further complicated by persistent media reports – denied by Herzog’s office – that discussions and legal deliberations concerning a possible pardon for Netanyahu took place even before Herzog assumed the presidency, including claims of back-channel understandings between the two. Even absent concrete proof of such arrangements, their circulation deepens public distrust and heightens the risk that any presidential decision will be perceived as politically tainted.

The path forward is clear. There can be no mid-trial pardon without an admission of wrongdoing and Netanyahu’s retirement from political life. Anything less would formalize a two-tier legal system – one for ordinary citizens and another for a prime minister who can evade judicial scrutiny by invoking “national unity.” Israelis may legitimately desire an end to the legal saga and political chaos. But quiet at the expense of accountability would not heal the system; it would further weaken it. In this sense, the future of Israeli democracy hangs in the balance.

The Crisis Of Accountability For Assaults On Palestinians

Len Rubenstein — Tue, 25 Nov 2025 14:52:11 GMT

Recent leaks in Israel and the United States highlight a pervasive absence of accountability for IDF war crimes. Congress should demand proper enforcement of the Leahy Law and call upon the State Department to produce a list of all IDF units for which credible information on abuses exists. In the longer term, it should work to explicitly require a uniform Leahy vetting process for all recipients of US security assistance.

Shortly after the ceasefire began in October, a bizarre turn of events further jeopardized the prospects for accountability for breaches of international law by the IDF in the war in Gaza and for settler violence inflicted on Palestinians in the West Bank. The Military Advocate General (MAG) of the IDF, Yifat Tomer-Yerushalemi, was arrested for leaking a video of Israeli soldiers allegedly sexually assaulting a Palestinian detainee in August 2024, which she claims she did to counter the right-wing’s vilification of her office’s investigation of the offense.

The leak immediately became a rallying cry for the far right in Israel, championing impunity for the IDF forces – and by extension – violent settlers, for any violence toward Palestinians throughout the war. Combined with other leaks revealing the pervasive lack of accountability, this case exemplifies the need for change.

Leaks Reveal a Pattern of War Crimes and Little Accountability

The Sde Teiman detention facility, created in the wake of October 7 at an IDF base near the Gaza border, operated outside the prison system, where most Palestinians held by Israel are detained. Almost immediately after its opening, media and human rights investigators revealed severe abuses against detainees there, including torture, persistent blindfolding – even during medical treatment, humiliation, and constant shackling that led to the need to amputate some detainees’ arms. In July 2024, the IDF, despite denying abuse, transferred hundreds of prisoners out of the facility. Meanwhile, the Military Advocate General (MAG) initiated an investigation of an incident of alleged torture and sexual abuse that was captured on video.

When military police detained nine soldiers for questioning in connection with the alleged sexual abuse, far-right activists, including two members of Netanyahu’s Knesset coalition, stormed the facility and demanded the soldiers’ release. Though they failed to free the soldiers, their assault on the military base went unpunished. Over a year later, after Israeli police discovered the MAG herself was responsible for the leak, the far right, and indeed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, sought to shut down not only the Sde Teiman investigation but all efforts at accountability for crimes committed by IDF soldiers during the war.

Meanwhile, a leaked State Department memorandum exemplified the pressing need for accountability for IDF conduct in Gaza. The classified memo revealed that various IDF units committed hundreds of potential violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip that, if substantiated, could require the cut-off of US arms transfers to those units.

The two leaks – one about detention practices and the other about US-supplied weapons – concern different legal issues and, of course, different investigative authorities. But the doubts both raise are whether there will ever be accountability, in Israel and via US arms transfer policy, for the serious violations of international law by Israeli forces since October 7.

Impunity for Assaults on Palestinians

For years, Israeli human rights organizations have filed complaints with the IDF for human rights and humanitarian law violations against Palestinians in the occupied territories – to no avail. Between 2000 and 2015, B’Tselem documented and filed more than 730 cases involving killings, beatings, and the use of Palestinians as human shields; only 3 percent led to charges. In 2016, recognizing that the complaint process merely lent legitimacy to a system designed to avoid accountability, B’Tselem announced it would stop submitting complaints altogether. Data from the Israeli military reveals that others continued submitting, with even poorer results: from 2017 and 2021, out of 1,260 complaints regarding harm to Palestinians or their property, fewer than 1 percent resulted in indictments.

The same pattern held in previous IDF operations in Gaza. Yesh Din revealed that of 664 complaints reaching the IDF’s fact-finding mechanism across the last three campaigns, only 19 criminal investigations were opened and just one indictment was issued.

Unsurprisingly, the trend persisted since October 7. The UK-based NGO Action on Armed Violence reported that of the 52 IDF cases opened between October 2023 and June 2025 – investigating incidents linked to the deaths of over 1,300 Palestinians – 88 percent were either closed without any finding of fault or left unresolved, and only one indictment was issued.

An example of the use of investigations as cover-ups is the IDF investigation’s claim that a Golani Brigade attack on Palestinian first responders, which killed 15 civilians in March 2025, was due to an “operational misunderstanding.” A New York Times video investigation proved that the IDF’s investigation dissembled on the facts. The Times report also included video evidence of the brigade commander telling his troops, in a gross violation of international law, that “everyone encountered is an enemy. If a figure is identified, open fire, eliminate them, and move on. Don’t get confused about this.” The IDF deputy commander of the unit who ordered the assault was dismissed, but no criminal charges were brought.

The Israeli military’s contempt for the law extended to high-level military planning, with Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir reportedly ignoring legal advice regarding potentially catastrophic harm to Palestinians in a major military operation in September 2025. As the IDF planned its assault on Gaza City, MAG Tomer-Yerushalmi questioned the legality of the operation because of the absence of the necessary humanitarian conditions for the million people who would have to be evacuated. She demanded that evacuation notices be postponed until those conditions were met. Zamir discarded her opinion, an action senior military officials told Haaretz was unprecedented for such a large operation.

The Crisis of Accountability Within the US State Department

If Israel refuses to hold its own soldiers and citizens accountable for grave violations of international law, the United States has tools of its own to do so. The prospects of their invocation, however, are currently dim. The Biden Administration importantly imposed sanctions on violent West Bank settlers, but declined to cease transfers of arms for use in Gaza despite overwhelming evidence of their use in violation of the laws of war.

We can expect nothing but hostility toward accountability from the Trump Administration, which revoked the sanctions on violent settlers. The administration also imposed sanctions against the International Criminal Court, closed the Pentagon’s program to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in its military operations, and dismantled the mechanism for assessing whether US-supplied weapons are being used in accordance with international law. In October, the State Department denounced as “corrupt” an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice affirming Israel’s obligation to provide humanitarian aid and to cooperate with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which the court also found had no ties with Hamas.

The leaked State Department memorandum on potential IDF violations, however, provides a new opportunity for US action on accountability. The memo identifies hundreds of cases that require review under the Leahy Law, which prohibits US security assistance to foreign military units when there is credible information that they committed gross human rights violations. While the Washington Post’s report on the memo did not disclose specific incidents, the Golani Brigade’s conduct both in the March 2025 ambulance case and in the August 2025 killing of 22 civilians, including journalists and first responders, at Nasser Hospital, suggests that credible information exists indicating gross human rights violations.

The primary obstacle to enforcing the Leahy Law, however, beyond the Trump Administration’s hostility toward accountability, is the uniquely complex, time-consuming and high-level process the State Department exclusively relies on in Israel’s case. For every other recipient of US military aid, Leahy vetting is relatively straightforward: working-level State Department experts review cases and determine whether credible information indicating abuses exists. Crucially, for other countries, this process actually works, resulting in agreed-upon ineligible units in countries such as Ukraine, Bangladesh, and Mexico.

But as the author of the law, former Senator Patrick Leahy, and Charles Blaha – the former State Department official who oversaw global Leahy vetting for seven years – have both explained, the State Department has a separate vetting process for Israel: the Israel Leahy Vetting Forum (ILVF). The ILVF uniquely requires formal written requests to the Israeli government for information on alleged abuses, and the Israelis can take up to three months to respond. It also mandates periodic in-person meetings, which further slows down the process (the regular Leahy vetting process occurs virtually). Most significantly, any final determination that an Israeli unit is ineligible to receive aid must be approved by the Deputy Secretary of State – a Senate-confirmed political appointee – rather than by the career professionals who handle determinations for other countries. The result of this arduous process is that not a single Israeli unit was barred from receiving US weapons for its conduct in Gaza.

Toward a Congressional Push for Accountability

Congress has a key role in promoting accountability. In addition to reimposing sanctions on violent West Bank settlers, Congress should call for annual reports from the State Department on Leahy vetting through the appropriations process, as it has done in the past. Further, given the now enormous trove of evidence of potential war crimes and crimes against humanity in the war, Congress should also instruct the State Department to produce a list of all IDF units that meet the credible information standard for gross human rights violations. Short of these actions, members of Congress can also demand proper application and enforcement of the Leahy Law, as Rep. James McGovern (D-MA) and his colleagues did in 2024. Members should also call on the State Department to vet Israel in the same way it does to other countries.

In the longer term, Congress can amend the Leahy Law to explicitly require a uniform vetting process applied at the same evidentiary threshold and by the same level of officials for all recipients of US military aid. It should also codify and define the “credible information” standard to ensure that the State Department cannot apply different burdens of proof to different countries.

Finally, Congress should call for an end to sanctions against the International Criminal Court and reject the Administration’s condemnation of the October 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman's White House Visit

Jen Gavito — Mon, 17 Nov 2025 16:35:17 GMT

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)’s scheduled meeting with President Trump at the White House this week can only be described as a full circle moment. This will be the first trip to Washington taken by the Saudi leader since March 2018. Relations with the US became strained by, among other things, the October 2018 assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. Against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire in Gaza, the agenda this week includes US-Saudi economic and security cooperation, as well as the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Bin Salman’s visit represents the renewal of bilateral relations and further solidifies Saudi Arabia as a key strategic partner of the United States. It remains to be seen whether this partnership can be leveraged toward full implementation of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, Israeli regional integration, and long-term stability for the wider Middle East.

Ups and Downs of US-Saudi Relations

The road to Saudi’s rehabilitation since 2018 has been a slow one, despite the robust, longstanding economic and security relationship between Washington and Riyadh. In July 2022, Bin Salman hosted President Biden at the Al Salam Royal Palace in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and the two leaders met again in September 2023 at the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India. The Jeddah trip was explicitly intended to reset US-Saudi relations after Biden had initially vowed to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” – following his administration’s release of an intelligence report in February 2021 asserting that MbS approved the killing of Khashoggi. Instead of penalizing Bin Salman personally and risking a total rupture of relations with Riyadh, the Biden Administration opted for sanctions against other Saudi officials associated with the killing of Khashoggi and instituted a “Khashoggi Ban” for those who targeted dissidents at the behest of foreign governments. In doing so, the US determined that Saudi Arabia is a key strategic partner in terms of its vast access to capital and combating terrorism, and that severing its relationship with the Kingdom would stymie Israeli regional integration and push the Saudis toward China.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of MbS has spent the past several years pursuing Vision 2030 to transform the Saudi economy, governance, and society, and establish the Kingdom as a global economic and geopolitical power. Riyadh has enacted significant reforms, notably lifting in 2018 the decades-old ban on women driving. Prior to the Hamas massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, Bin Salman had also confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Israel “get closer” every day to normalizing relations.

Since his re-election, President Trump – who has a penchant for transactional diplomacy – has put a renewed US-Saudi relationship firmly at the center of his administration’s broader Middle East policy. In May 2025, Trump visited Riyadh (along with Doha and Abu Dhabi) in the first major overseas trip of his second term. Speaking there at the US-Saudi Investment Forum, he announced a commitment by the Kingdom to invest $600 billion in the United States, building upon the multibillion-dollar agreements with Saudi Arabia that he forged in his first term. Trump also repeated his call for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, despite consistent statements by Saudi Arabia throughout the Gaza war that it would not consider doing so until irrevocable progress is made toward Palestinian statehood.

The Saudi Crown Prince Comes to Washington

MbS arrives in Washington this week, representing a region that looks fundamentally different than even just a few months ago. Since Trump’s visit to Riyadh, Israel with US assistance undertook a sustained campaign against the Iranian regime and its nuclear capabilities inside Iran. Additionally, a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel was finally reached in October, opening the door to renewed discussion of normalization but also setting in motion an enormous stability and reconstruction effort in Gaza to which President Trump hopes Saudi Arabia will be a major contributor. And just last week, Trump hosted interim Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa at the White House, capping a stunning path to normalization set in motion by MbS in Riyadh – where he successfully lobbied Trump to lift sanctions on the one-time jihadist and, in doing so, helped place Saudi Arabia at the center of the Trump Administration’s Middle East strategy.

Despite Trump having reiterated his hope in recent days that Saudi Arabia will soon join the Abraham Accords, it is unlikely that significant progress will be made toward that goal in the near term. Riyadh has reaffirmed its position that without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, Saudi Arabia will not normalize relations with Israel. Instead, this week’s visit is expected to focus heavily on continuing the progress made back in May on expanding the US-Saudi commercial relationship. It will also further solidify the Kingdom as a key strategic partner of the US.

Trump is expected to host a dinner at the White House in honor of MbS. And the two leaders are expected to announce major new deals, including a new US-Saudi defense pact and potential progress toward advanced weapons transfers and civilian-nuclear cooperation. Additionally, a US-Saudi Investment Forum will take place on November 19 at the Kennedy Center, although it is unclear whether Trump and Bin Salman will directly participate. However they unfold, these events will represent the culmination of the post-Khashoggi rehabilitation of the Kingdom, paving the way for enhanced US-Saudi economic and security cooperation, including on issues surrounding Iran and China.

Implications for the US and Israel

This week’s visit comes amidst continued violations of Phase I of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, further complicating the already thorny issues that await in Phase II such as establishing an International Stabilization Force. The Trump Administration has, to the surprise of some, dedicated consistent focus to ensuring progress continues, including by standing up a significant combined US civilian-military presence to oversee the work. Trump seemingly understands that wider regional stability hinges on preventing future violence between Israel and the Palestinians and creating a pathway to Palestinian statehood. With MbS all but certain to double down on that message, it appears likely that Trump will emerge from the discussions with renewed focus on pressuring both the Israeli government and Hamas to move forward with Phase II implementation.

Israel, meanwhile, is likely to keep a wary eye not just on how Saudi Arabia will shape and contribute to those next steps, but also on the potential implications of an expanding and more institutionalized US-Saudi defense relationship. While such cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia would conceivably support Israeli security by serving as a greater counterbalance to Iran, the provision of advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia is nonetheless likely to erode Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge over its neighbors – a concept that is still enshrined in US law but seems no longer to serve as a check on US relations with the Gulf. MbS has proven to have Trump’s ear on the full range of regional issues, so whatever comes out of their discussions will surely be consequential.

Normalization Still a Long Way Away

Washington this week will be full of ceremonial pomp, glitzy dinners, and enormous investment agreements. But in some ways, particularly for Israel, it will be but a mile-marker on a much longer journey. Against a persistently complicated regional backdrop, normalization between Israel and its neighbors via expansion of the Abraham Accords will continue to be a foundation of the Trump Administration’s policy in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia remains the big prize for Trump in his quest to become the “Peace President.” For that, there are no real shortcuts. Especially in the aftermath of the Gaza war, there is unlikely to be major progress on this front without real movement toward addressing the next steps of the peace plan in Gaza and a more credible direction toward Palestinian statehood.

WATCH: The Way Forward on Syria and Lebanon

J Street Staff — Fri, 07 Nov 2025 20:19:29 GMT

The J Street Policy Center hosted a timely briefing on the shifting political landscape in Syria and Lebanon ahead of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s historic visit to the White House.

Regional experts Ibrahim Al-Assil and Jasmine El-Gamal discussed what Sharaa’s rise and rapidly shifting dynamics in Lebanon mean for US policy, regional stability and the future of Israel’s northern borders. You can watch the full conversation above.

Egypt’s Role in Gaza and Its Relations With Israel

Dr. Marwa Maziad — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 22:12:12 GMT

Egypt and Israel have maintained a cold peace for more than four decades. The two countries engage in significant economic and security cooperation, but their relations were strained by the Gaza war. While the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty was not seriously tested during wartime, diplomatic representation was downgraded, heavy criticisms were exchanged, and Egyptian defenses were readied in the Sinai Peninsula. Throughout the war, Egypt played a critical role in negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Cairo was integral to achieving the Gaza peace deal signed in Sharm El-Sheikh last month and is now a central player in efforts to rebuild Gaza, unify Palestinians, and forge a wider regional peace. The US government should work with Egypt to advance the October Peace Summit agenda and seize postwar momentum to finally warm the peace between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt’s Role Before and After October 7

Before October 7

Egypt played a central mediating role in all four major conflicts between Israel and Hamas in Gaza that preceded October 7: Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), and Operation Protective Edge (2014), and Operation Guardian of the Walls (2021). Through diplomatic and intelligence channels, Egypt helped broker the ceasefires that ended these cycles of violence.

Given the border that it shares with Gaza, Egypt has long prioritized stability in the Strip and has serious concerns that instability in Gaza could spill over to its territory. Egypt uses the Rafah border crossing – the only land exit from Gaza that is not controlled by Israel – as a negotiating tool, granting or denying access to people and goods in order to pressure or reward the parties. Egyptian control of its side of the border with Gaza also functions as a security tool, which Cairo uses as an effective bargaining chip in negotiations. Egyptian security forces also prevent the smuggling of weapons between the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula.

After October 7

On October 21, 2023, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi urgently convened Arab leaders, including Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, for the Cairo Peace Summit to de-escalate the Israel-Hamas war. At the summit, Sisi condemned “in the clearest terms, the targeting, killing and intimidation of peaceful civilians” on October 7, and announced a surge of humanitarian aid delivery through Rafah in partnership with the United States.

From the outset of the Gaza war, Egypt rejected the mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai, refusing complicity in ethnic cleansing. Still, foreign nationals, dual citizens, and medical evacuees were admitted to Egypt during the war, along with Palestinians who crossed through Rafah in exceptional humanitarian cases. Egypt also struck a careful balance between maintaining its 1979 peace treaty with Israel and managing both domestic and regional expectations of solidarity with Palestinians. Cairo maintained relative stability at the border, protecting Egyptian personnel from Israeli bombardment and satisfying mutual Egyptian-Israeli security interests. Similar to the previous four conflicts, Egypt was eager to swiftly broker a negotiated ceasefire, but had not anticipated the catastrophe that unfolded.

The Future of Egypt-Israel Peace

Before the Gaza peace deal, Egypt and Israel were engaged in a war of words, worrying some that the 1979 peace treaty was at risk. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Egypt of “imprisoning against their will residents in Gaza who want to leave a war zone” by opposing mass evacuation of Palestinians to Sinai. An estimated 100,000 Gazans crossed the border during the war, and the Palestinian embassy in Cairo is now seeking temporary residence permits for them. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty responded to Netanyahu by saying that “displacement means liquidation and the end of the Palestinian cause.”

In September 2025, President Sisi made reference to an “enemy” in the context of the September 9 Israeli airstrike on Doha, Qatar. This was interpreted as the first time since 1977 that Egypt referred to Israel as such. That same month, Egypt deployed a long-range missile defense system to the Sinai, fueling speculation about potential escalation with Israel. However, Egypt’s military buildup in the Sinai and policy of not allowing Palestinian relocation there should be understood as a strategy for maintaining stability on both sides of the border. Egypt avoided complicity in Palestinian ethnic cleansing that would have created a temporary refugee crisis in the Sinai, fomented resistance within Egypt, and further destabilized Gaza.

After the two-year Gaza war, Egypt-Israel peace remains stable. Diplomatic relations may have been strained, but the peace treaty was never seriously tested. Sisi hailed the Sharm El-Sheikh breakthrough in October as the “last chance” for peace, committing not just to a ceasefire in Gaza but to a wider peace for the region that could finally warm the cold peace between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt’s Role in the Gaza Peace Deal

Cairo to New York

During the two-year war in Gaza, Egypt served as a key mediator between Israel and Hamas, helping to broker the temporary ceasefires in November 2023 and January 2025, as well as the permanent ceasefire in October 2025. On March 4, 2025, Egypt hosted an emergency summit in Cairo, where the Arab League endorsed the $53 billion Egyptian plan for rebuilding Gaza over the next five years. The Egyptian plan served as a blueprint for the groundbreaking “New York Declaration,” signed by the Arab League (alongside the EU and 17 other countries) at a UN conference on the two-state solution in July 2025.

Egypt leveraged this diplomatic momentum, coordinating negotiations alongside the US and Qatar that culminated in the Gaza ceasefire agreement last month. Egypt also relied on its historical role as the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, as mediator between Israel and Hamas in previous Gaza conflicts, and as the gatekeeper of the Rafah crossing. Egypt functioned as a regional hub connecting Israel, Hamas, Qatar and the United States. While Qatar is a Hamas interlocutor and the US is a global superpower, Egypt utilized its leadership credibility in the Arab world, intelligence capability, knowledge, expertise, and institutional memory accumulated over decades of engagement in Gaza and with all the relevant parties. Ultimately, Egypt was able to provide guarantees to both sides regarding border control, humanitarian access, and security cooperation that helped bridge the gaps.

Sharm El-Sheikh

At the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit on October 13, Egypt co-signed the Trump Peace Agreement to “end the war in Gaza and bring lasting peace to the Middle East.” US President Donald Trump praised Egypt for its “very important role” in ending the war and President Sisi awarded Trump the “Order of the Nile,” the highest state honor in Egypt. As host of the peace summit, Sisi reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to the two-state solution, including an independent Palestinian state “living side by side with Israel in peace, security, and mutual recognition.” He issued a direct “call to the people of Israel,” invoking the late Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. Sisi also committed to Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza, which incorporates several components of the March 2025 Egyptian plan. Crucially, Trump’s plan insists that “no one will be forced to leave Gaza,” reflecting the emphasis that Egypt has placed on preventing mass displacement.

After initially rejecting the Egyptian plan back in March, Trump dispensed with his earlier “Gaza Riviera” proposal and adopted elements of Egypt’s proposal, demonstrating the considerable influence and determination of the Egyptian government, as well as the trust between Trump and Sisi. The US was not the only player skeptical of the Egyptian plan early on; the United Arab Emirates reportedly criticized the plan as unworkable and lobbied the Trump Administration to reject it. Despite this opposition, Egypt continued advocating for the proposal until its eventual incorporation into Trump’s framework. Had the parties heeded the Egyptians sooner, Gaza could potentially have avoided months of bloodshed.

Egypt’s Role in the Future of Gaza

Reconstruction

After the October 13 Peace Summit, President Sisi announced that Egypt will host another conference in November for the reconstruction of Gaza. The international community is expected to gather in Cairo to start implementing Egypt’s multi-phase reconstruction plan, which includes debris removal, rebuilding homes and critical infrastructure, restoring essential services, among many other development projects. In a preview of this direct Egyptian involvement, Egypt sent a technical team into Gaza with Israel’s approval to help locate the remains of deceased Israeli hostages. Egypt is asserting its role as the most important external player in Gaza, and indeed as the Um al-Dunya (“Mother of the World” in Arabic), determined to rebuild the Gaza Strip and help shape its future.

Security

The Egyptian plan acknowledges that “reconstruction requires arrangements for transitional governance and security arrangements,” and outlines a process for returning the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza. The plan calls on the UN Security Council to “deploy international protection/peacekeeping forces” and notes that Egypt is training PA forces for redeployment to the Strip. Similarly, Trump’s 20-point plan proposes the formation of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). While the international community expects Egypt to lead the ISF, Egypt expects significant global investment, including from the United States, as well as a clear pathway for Palestinian self-governance. Cairo will not lead a fight to defeat Hamas militarily, but instead provide support for Palestinian police to reassert basic security over Gaza. Per the US plan, the ISF will coordinate with both the IDF and the new US Central Command Civil-Military Coordination Center, “with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens.”

Governance

Both the Egyptian and American plans call for the establishment of an interim governance body composed of independent Palestinian technocrats with oversight by the international community. Under the Egyptian plan, this “Gaza Administration Committee” would manage Gazan affairs for a transitional period of six months within the framework of a PA return. Under the Trump plan, the Palestinian committee would be supervised by an international “Board of Peace,” chaired by President Trump. In all likelihood, President Sisi will serve as a member of the board.

To facilitate Palestinian unity for postwar governance of Gaza, Egypt hosted Hamas and Fatah delegations in Cairo last month. The rival Palestinian groups came to an agreement on the technocratic committee for Gaza. While this committee will not include any members of Hamas or the other Palestinian political parties, Hamas will realistically need to at least consent to or agree on committee membership. Alongside the Hamas-Fatah talks, Egypt’s intelligence chief Hassan Rashad met with other key Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to “achieve national Palestinian consensus on the implementation of the US president’s ceasefire plan in Gaza.” Egypt has demonstrated willingness to participate in Palestinian unification and transitional governance, without taking control of Gaza, doing Israel’s bidding, or clashing with Hamas on the ground. Instead, Egypt has a vision for limited participation welcomed by all Palestinian factions that ultimately helps unify Gaza and the West Bank.

Iran Policy Memo: What Comes Next

J Street Staff — Mon, 03 Nov 2025 18:41:20 GMT

For the past 18 months, Iran has suffered one strategic setback after another. The downward trend began with the Biden Administration successfully defending Israel against two brazen Iranian missile attacks and continued with the degradation of Hezbollah, the fall of Assad, and the devastation of the 12-day war. The most recent challenge for Iran came on September 27, when the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) implemented the snapback mechanism, reimposing UN sanctions that had been lifted by the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

Iran is now weak and vulnerable, yet perhaps as dangerous as ever. The reality is that, despite the operational successes of the past two years, the first Trump Administration’s decision to walk away from the Iran nuclear agreement, combined with the recent war between Israel and Iran, means that Iran may be more motivated than ever to pursue a nuclear weapon while maintaining the capability to do so. Absent a renewed diplomatic process, additional conflict seems likely, if not inevitable. However, diplomatic progress is attainable and remains the best approach for addressing the challenges posed by Iran. This memo outlines the current state of affairs, warns against further military action and proposes tangible steps to support diplomacy, reduce tensions with Iran, and increase US and regional security.

Current State of Play

There is a triumphalist attitude in certain hawkish policy corners regarding the recent pressure imposed on Iran. However, an honest assessment of the situation highlights the costly and counterproductive actions taken by the Trump Administration and the Netanyahu government. Despite the Trump Administration’s claims that the nuclear program has been obliterated, senior American and Israeli officials acknowledge that Iran retains large quantities of highly enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, now without any IAEA oversight. The ongoing nuclear risk is further heightened by domestic Iranian calls for nuclear breakout in the aftermath of the war, and the considerable knowledge and technical expertise that Iran has developed since President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Beyond the nuclear program, the Iranian government remains relatively stable, perhaps even strengthened, after the 12-day war. Despite Israel’s impressive operational successes against Iranian military leadership targets, a new echelon of Iranian military leadership emerged within days, and there is no indication that Iran’s military resilience or decision-making has been meaningfully altered. Although its missile program and support for non-state proxies are diminished, Iran continues to project power externally – including through the Houthis – threatening regional security and commercial interests. Furthermore, the decision to strike Evin Prison and create a “liberation day” in Iran was an epic blunder that provided the Iranian regime with a significant propaganda victory and underscored just how poorly the Netanyahu government understands the Iranian people.

As this reality sets in, misplaced euphoria about the strikes will fade, and hawks will likely call for additional strikes to “mow the lawn” or “finish the job.” The odds of more conflict are further increased as Iran prepares for a second war with Israel and continues its nuclear escalation following the snapback of UN sanctions. This cycle of escalation will give hawks in Israel, the United States and Iran justification to restart the conflict.

Risk of a Second War is High

The rapid – and likely temporary – off-ramp to the 12-day war obscures the costs of the June conflict. More than 900 Iranians and 28 Israelis were killed, many of them civilians, while thousands of others were injured and displaced on both sides. Around 240 buildings and over 2,000 homes in Israel were damaged or destroyed by retaliatory Iranian strikes. If the conflict restarts, civilians will again be caught in the crosshairs, and innocent lives will be lost in a conflict with questionable strategic upside and significant risk. Counting on a repeat rapid off-ramp is a dubious strategy.

A second war is not only likely – with both Iran and Israel preparing for a second round – but also set to be more intense. There is no written or agreed-upon ceasefire in place and continued peace is largely reliant on Trump holding Netanyahu back. This may work in the short run, but privately, Israeli officials are now referring to the 12-day war as the first Iran war and believe the next round will more aggressively target Iran’s missile program and the regime. For its part, Iran is unlikely to be caught as unprepared again.

There is no denying that Iran remains a significant threat to Israel – look no further than Iranian complicity in the October 7 Hamas attack – but Trump and Netanyahu starting a war with Iran on the pretext of countering the Iranian nuclear threat is strategically reckless. The international community had a working solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge: the JCPOA. The landmark agreement reached in July 2015 between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, plus Germany) did more to restrain the Iranian nuclear program than any aerial campaign ever could. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and allow for more extensive international inspections of its nuclear facilities, in exchange for nuclear-related sanctions relief.

Yet with the support of Netanyahu, Trump abandoned the diplomatic agreement in 2018, setting Tehran back on a path toward a nuclear crisis. Before the 12-day war, Iran’s breakout time decreased from one year, as required by the JCPOA, to under two weeks, and it could produce the nuclear fuel needed for five to six bombs in this two-week period. Even after the strikes, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months.

Ultimately, Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in his first term helped create the pretext for bombing Iran in his second term. The net result has been a strengthened Iranian nuclear program – even after the strikes – with a stronger incentive to pursue weaponization, a significant investment of American taxpayer dollars to defend Israel, the endangering of US troops, innocent civilian deaths and an increased risk of a destabilized region.

The Way Forward: Diplomacy, Not Military Action

Renewed diplomacy, not additional military action, should be the obvious path forward for US policymakers. Yet, after initial interest from the Trump Administration in a post-conflict diplomatic revival, neither side seems willing to return to the negotiating table.

Iran appears to be focused on minimizing the damage of snapback sanctions and rebuilding diplomatic and military leverage. The Trump Administration will likely continue to cycle through all Iran-related policy options – maximum economic pressure, military strikes and periodic attempts at diplomacy – with minimal coherence. And the Netanyahu government seems resistant to any form of realistic diplomacy, instead pushing to change the Iranian regime, which is both difficult to achieve and, ironically, made even less likely by clumsy attempts like the Evin prison bombing.

Still, the 12-day war has at least demonstrated the limits of both containment and military action. Israeli security officials have, in the past, backed a deal to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And, with Israel already stretched thin on multiple fronts, in the West Bank, Gaza, Yemen, and beyond, it does not need more fighting with Iran. Nor should Israel drag the US into another endless regime change war in the Middle East that results in a power vacuum and regional instability. Diplomacy is the only sustainable solution to the Iran problem.

J Street recommends the following actions be taken to promote diplomacy over the short, medium and long-term:

Avoid getting dragged back into war. The most urgent priority is ensuring fighting does not restart. President Trump has repeatedly campaigned on ending “stupid forever wars” and needs to be held accountable to this pledge. Trump declared a “complete and total ceasefire” and the Administration must keep this in mind every time hawks within the United States and Israel start pushing for renewed conflict.

Continue seeking short-term measures to re-establish full IAEA presence in Iran. Iran’s stonewalling of the IAEA and potential withdrawal from the NPT are significant concerns. Without the IAEA on the ground inspecting Iran’s nuclear program, the international community has no way to verify that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon. Therefore, the United States and E3 need to remain open to interim measures through which Iran would resume full cooperation with the IAEA.

Warn Iran against continued nuclear escalation. Diplomacy advocates would be well-served to remind Iran against overreacting to snapback and the long-term risk of keeping the IAEA out of Iran. Ultimately, Iran’s actions will give Iran hawks a pretext to restart the conflict. Furthermore, Iran’s previous retaliatory nuclear escalations are a key reason why a return to the JCPOA is no longer viable – its advances in research and development eroded much of the agreement’s original value to the West. Additional nuclear leverage will not advance diplomacy.

Support a new deal with Iran, but acknowledge that it will have to be different from the JCPOA. Any future deal will build on the elements and lessons of the JCPOA – almost certainly including nuclear-related commitments in return for nuclear-related sanctions relief. However, although withdrawing from the JCPOA was a catastrophic mistake, Iran’s nuclear advances and the consequences of the direct conflict between Israel and Iran have made a return to the deal impossible. A new agreement will likely need to account for Iran’s nuclear advances, including on weaponization; address other issues related to the Iran-Israel conflict – such as missiles and proxies; and include new partners like the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Take advantage of the Gulf States’ desire to normalize relations and de-escalate tensions with both Israel and Iran. One of the most significant regional developments of the past decade has been the Gulf States’ shift in approach toward Iran – from confrontation to engagement and de-escalation – as they prioritize economic growth and diversification. Similarly, both Israel and Iran are seeking further integration with the Gulf. The United States, working with the Gulf States, should leverage these trends to incentivize both Israel and Iran to de-escalate their regional competition. Indeed, such an approach would complement a broader strategy that pursues a 23-state solution – comprehensive regional peace between Israel and all its neighbors, and establishing a Palestinian state.

Define the endgame. Finally, American, Israeli, European and Arab policymakers – both governmental and non-governmental – must engage in honest conversations about the ultimate objectives of Iran policy. Is the goal Netanyahu’s fanciful and counterproductive vision of regime change? Is it perpetual conflict? If not, then the US and Israel need to begin a dialogue regarding what a realistic Iran agreement looks like and how the Israel-Iran relationship can be rebalanced. The United States must also clarify its own objectives: What are our top priorities in a deal with Iran, what is achievable and how best to pursue these goals?

The Economic Benefits of the 23-State Solution

Avraham Spraragen — Thu, 30 Oct 2025 20:43:17 GMT

J Street supports a comprehensive regional agreement that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, in turn, provides Israel with full acceptance by the 22 member states of the Arab League. For this solution to work, the 23rd state must be Palestine. Besides the obvious security benefits of a 23-state solution, the potential economic benefits for all parties are innumerable.

The 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab states – UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco – have already borne economic fruit. The annual value of trade and investments between Israel and Abraham Accords countries was estimated to exceed $10 billion in 2023. The longstanding peace agreements between Israel and the bordering countries of Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) have also yielded decades of economic growth. Between 2021 and 2024, trade between Israel and its Abraham Accords partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, increased by a remarkable 127 percent.

These proven economic benefits demonstrate that a comprehensive regional agreement, which includes the remaining 16 Arab League states, would bolster Israel’s economy while the country faces growing isolation and economic downturn. Instead of Netanyahu’s “Super Sparta” vision, Israel should embrace a 23-state solution for its own economic benefit and the flourishing of the entire regional economy.

Economic Benefits of the Abraham Accords

United Arab Emirates

The UAE was the first Abraham Accords signatory to officially normalize relations with Israel and has since become Israel’s largest Arab trading partner. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, UAE-Israel bilateral trade reached $2.95 billion in 2023.

The same year, Israel and the UAE signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), aiming to increase bilateral trade beyond $10 billion within five years. Under the CEPA, Israel opened an Economic & Trade Mission to the UAE.

The two countries now collaborate, trade, and conduct business across many sectors: defense, emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, communication, transportation, space, energy, water and climate, food and agriculture, arts and culture, health, education, and tourism.

Israel and the UAE have constructed a land corridor – through Saudi Arabia and Jordan – to improve supply chains, and new direct flights from Tel Aviv to Abu Dhabi and Dubai have boosted tourism for both countries.
Israel and the UAE have also formed the I2U2 Group with India and the United States, and the UAE endorsed a plan to create an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The IMEC would build upon the UAE-Israel land corridor, serve as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and promote further economic cooperation.

With US backing, Israel and the UAE established the Abraham Fund to “catalyze economic growth” through mobilizing $3 billion in private sector-led investment and development initiatives.

Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco

After the UAE, Bahrain became the fourth Arab country to normalize relations with Israel. Bahrain-Israel bilateral trade reached $11.5 million in 2023, and the two countries have taken steps toward a free trade agreement (FTA).

Sudan became the fifth country and Morocco the sixth to normalize relations with Israel. While trade with Sudan has been stalled by the ongoing civil war there, Morocco-Israel bilateral trade reached $116 million in 2023.

Israel and Morocco signed an economic cooperation and trade agreement in 2022 with a five-year target of $500 million in annual bilateral trade. This agreement brings the two countries closer to a formal FTA, which could eventually develop into a free trade zone for the whole region. Next year, Israel is reportedly planning to appoint its first economic attaché to Morocco.

Economic Benefits of Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel Peace

Egypt

Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979 that includes a commitment to “promoting beneficial economic relations.” Egypt has since become Israel’s second-largest Arab trading partner. In 2022, the two countries set a three-year target of $700 million in annual bilateral trade, and reached $477 million in 2023.

In addition, natural gas exports from Israel to Egypt in 2023 reached an estimated $1.5 billion. Both countries are members of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional energy forum headquartered in Cairo (that also includes Jordan and Palestine). This year, Israel signed a $35 billion15-year natural gas export deal with Egypt.

The two countries also collaborate economically via the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ), a program that allows Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine to export products to the United States duty-free, provided the products contain inputs from Israel. In 2024, Egypt exported $1.3 billion in QIZ products – 52 percent of its total exports to the US.

Jordan

Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994 and a corresponding “Trade and Economic Cooperation” agreement. In 2023, Israel-Jordan bilateral trade reached $1 billion, when factoring in water and gas exports from Israel to Jordan.

Israel relies on Jordan as an economic bridge to large regional markets, especially in the Gulf. Along their shared border, Israel and Jordan are constructing a joint industrial park to facilitate the transfer of goods. The $35 million “Jordan Gateway” project is expected to create 15,000 new jobs

Another major bilateral initiative is Project Prosperity, a climate change mitigation and sustainability project. In 2022, Israel, Jordan, and the UAE, with US oversight, signed the two-part agreement: Prosperity Green (energy) and Prosperity Blue (water). The project, which has been stymied by the Gaza war, involves building a solar energy plant in Jordan for supplying clean energy to Israel in exchange for desalinated water.

Israel at a Crossroads: Regional Integration or Economic Isolation

The potential economic benefits of expanding the Abraham Accords and implementing a 23-state solution are innumerable. According to a Rand Corporation study, if the Abraham Accords expand to include additional major Arab and Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, they could produce more than four million new jobs and more than $1 trillion in new economic activity over the coming decade.

Prior to October 7, Israel and Saudi Arabia were making progress toward normalization. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told US media in September 2023 that “every day we get closer” to normalizing relations with Israel – and Netanyahu concurred. The Gaza war had stalled these efforts, but the recent deal to end the war could revive them. In Egypt earlier this month, Arab states joined in a peaceful settlement of the Gaza war, reviving prospects for greater regional peace.

Israel is standing at a crossroads and must choose regional integration over economic isolation. According to Rand, normalizing relations with major Arab and Muslim states, including the “crown jewel” of Saudi Arabia, as well as Indonesia and Pakistan, would generate $260 billion in economic activity in Israel over ten years, creating 107,000 jobs. A negotiated end to the decades-long Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory would also relieve Israel of the devastating costs of never-ending conflict.

The alternative is for Israel to keep paying the heavy price of Netanyahu’s short-sighted “Super Sparta” approach. Last month, the European Union, Israel’s largest trading partner – accounting for 32% of its total trade – moved to downgrade economic relations in response to the Gaza war. Similarly, last year, all three leading credit rating agencies downgraded Israel’s rating to its lowest in decades, citing regional instability and defense spending. This is just a small preview of the economic isolation that Israel would endure if it continues down the path of perpetual conflict. Israel can either suffer those consequences or pursue a 23-state solution that unleashes the economic potential of the region – the choice is clear.

Israel Two Years On: Politics After the Ceasefire

Yael Patir — Thu, 30 Oct 2025 20:31:30 GMT

Two years after the October 7 massacre, Israel stands at a political crossroads. The fighting is currently at a halt, but the future remains unclear. US envoys and senior officials fly in and out, probing who exactly governs and what direction the country is headed. The hostages who survived are home – a major national relief – but questions about accountability, recovery, and leadership persist.

Public opinion offers one clear signal: most Israelis supported ending the war to secure the hostages’ release. A recent survey found that 76 percent of Israelis favor the ceasefire agreement that ended the war in Gaza, compared with only 11 percent opposed and 13 percent undecided. Among Jewish Israelis, support stands at 73 percent, while an overwhelming 88 percent of Arab citizens back the deal. Notably, a majority of coalition voters – 57 percent – also support the agreement, alongside 91 percent among opposition voters. This rare consensus cuts across political and demographic lines.

With the Gaza war’s second anniversary behind it, Israel is already shifting into campaign mode. Elections are expected as early as June 2026, several months before the official deadline. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, earlier is better: he would prefer to ride the momentum of the ceasefire, return of the hostages, and military victories against Iran and its regional proxies. He also hopes to showcase diplomatic breakthroughs – potential new signatories of the Abraham Accords – while keeping any reckoning for October 7 safely distant.

A Crowded Agenda and a Restless Knesset

When the Knesset reconvened in mid-October, lawmakers faced a packed agenda. The most urgent items are familiar: the conscription bill for ultra-Orthodox men, the wartime budget, renewed debates over annexation, and legislation aimed at curbing the independence of Israel’s judiciary. Beyond these, little meaningful legislation is expected; the coalition simply lacks the votes.

The two ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), have withdrawn most of their active participation in the coalition – leaving Netanyahu with a minority government. Every vote now carries existential weight, and the winter session is likely to be dominated by political bargaining rather than lawmaking.

Netanyahu’s Calculus

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategy hinges on balancing three forces pulling in different directions: (1) The ultra-Orthodox parties demand permanent exemptions from military service, while the (2) Religious Zionist bloc views this as a historic opportunity to entrench Israeli sovereignty across the West Bank, officially annex the territory, and bury the idea of Palestinian statehood. (3) At the same time, Netanyahu must navigate the Trump Administration’s increasingly assertive stance and its efforts to redraw regional alignments.

Washington prefers a quiet front in Gaza, gradual regional normalization, and no unilateral annexation – as emphasized just last week during US Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit and in statements made subsequently by President Trump. Each decision – on the budget, draft law, and settlement expansion – reverberates across this triangle of competing pressures. For now, Netanyahu’s goal is to maintain a fragile equilibrium until the timing is right for elections.

Is Annexation on the Table?

The Religious Zionist bloc has emerged as the driving force behind what is no longer “creeping” but accelerated annexation policy. With the Finance, National Security, and Settlements portfolios under their control, as well as MK Bezalel Smotrich’s ministerial position in Defense, Religious Zionist ministers have reshaped West Bank governance and land allocation.

Since October 7, the pace of annexation policy has accelerated: unprecedented settlement expansion, a record number of outposts legalized, and the Palestinian Authority’s influence deliberately weakened. Yet Netanyahu recently drew a temporary line. The prime minister instructed his coalition chair “not to advance proposals regarding the application of sovereignty in Judea and Samaria until further notice.” Meanwhile, Education Minister Yoav Kisch stated during a Knesset debate: “I deeply believe in sovereignty, but it is not achieved through opposition initiatives. We are building it every day on the ground.”

As Minister Kisch stated, de facto annexation proceeds: construction budgets rise, land designations expand, and administrative powers shift from military to civilian hands. Even without a formal declaration, the outcome of these policies could make annexation a fait accompli.

2026 Israeli Election

The upcoming Israeli election will be a contest between five broad camps:

Democratic camp: Led by opposition figures Yair Lapid, Yair Golan, Avigdor Liberman and former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. Though they share a commitment to democratic norms and fatigue with Netanyahu’s rule, the democratic camp lacks cohesion. This election will see at least two additional parties enter the camp, led by Yoaz Hendel and Gadi Eisenkot.
The camp’s success will depend on merging forces and avoiding vote-splitting – a challenge that has repeatedly eluded them. Women remain notably absent from the camp’s leadership circle, which reflects Israel’s enduring political gender gap. Bennett is still considered Netanyahu’s most credible rival. In a poll taken after the ceasefire deal this month, Likud is the largest party in the Knesset, winning 31 seats. Bennett’s new party wins 18 seats – a decline from previous polling, but still within striking distance.
Netanyahu camp: Consisting of the prime minister and his loyalists. Their devotion to Netanyahu is personal, ideological, and the source of his durability. Netanyahu’s loyalists align themselves with the prime minister’s “us versus them” worldview. They benefit from being part of his inner circle. Loyalists are captured by his narrative of perpetual crisis, and also fear the alternative to Netanyahu.

Ultra-Orthodox camp: Longtime kingmakers in right-wing coalitions led by Netanyahu’s Likud, the ultra-Orthodox parties have recently signalled profound discontent with the alliance. UTJ, representing the Ashkenazi Haredi population, formally withdrew from the coalition over the failure to legislate the military-service exemption for yeshiva students. Similarly, the Shas party, representing the Sephardi and Mizrahi Haredi populations, relinquished its cabinet roles. The longstanding exemption from IDF conscription for ultra-Orthodox men has been challenged by recent judicial rulings and public pressure during the Gaza war. Meanwhile, the Haredi population continues to grow and their Knesset parties are grappling with generational tensions. UTJ and Shas risk alienating younger voters to more right-wing nationalist parties, lest they extract additional guarantees from the government. Whether the Haredi parties choose the path of independent challengers or coalition loyalists will determine not only their fate, but the composition of the next governing coalition.

Messianic right: Led by Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who seek not only sovereignty over the West Bank but a broader legal and cultural revolution – rewriting laws, redefining citizenship, and embedding Jewish supremacy as the organizing principle of the state. Their parliamentary weight is limited, but they have considerable political influence: the right’s narrow majority makes Ben-Gvir and Smotrich indispensable, allowing them to punch above their weight and shape the agenda.

The Arab Parties: Led by Mansour Abbas, Ayman Odeh, and Ahmad Tibi, the Arab bloc will also play a key role in the coming elections. Mansour Abbas’ Ra’am party cooperated with the democratic camp to form a government in 2021, and the possibility of renewed cooperation means higher Arab voter participation could tip the balance toward the democratic camp. However, mistrust between Jewish and Arab voters runs deep after two years of war, and right-wing parties are expected to exploit this divide by framing any Jewish-Arab partnership as illegitimate. Beyond voter turnout and alliances, there is also a growing risk that Netanyahu’s government will undermine the electoral process itself by passing disqualification laws that target the Arab parties.

Civic Pressure and the Moral Center

The Hostage Families Forum and the bereaved relatives’ movement have played a central role in shaping Israel’s national conscience. Their call for accountability – most notably through demands for a state commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7 – has stirred broad public empathy. When the Knesset panel rejected their proposal, the families accused the government of “burying the truth.”

Together with the pro-democracy protest movement, which managed to block Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul for now, these networks have shown an exceptional ability to mobilize Israelis who feel unrepresented in the current Knesset. They have also elevated a new generation of civic leaders whose empathy and moral clarity resonate beyond partisan lines. Yet as their influence has grown, so has the backlash. In recent months, right-wing media and coalition figures have sought to discredit the Hostage Families Forum’s leaders, accusing them of “weakening the army” and “dividing the nation.” Commentators in pro-government outlets blame the pre-war protest organizers for undermining unity before October 7, and the hostage movement for doing so after – a rhetorical inversion that shifts blame from those in power to those demanding accountability.

What began as a movement of compassion and solidarity is being recast as a threat to national strength. The Hostage Families Forum has become both the symbol of Israel’s conscience and the target of efforts to silence it. The challenge moving forward is whether it translates into winning elections, influencing legislative agendas, and shifting public opinion.

Netanyahu’s Legal Shadow

Netanyahu’s corruption trials continue, but their political relevance has largely faded. What once threatened his rule has become background noise, overshadowed by the war and a coordinated campaign to weaken the judiciary itself.

In recent months, ministers and coalition figures have intensified their attacks on Israel’s legal institutions – not only questioning the courts’ authority but attempting to rewrite it. Justice Minister Yariv Levin and his allies now argue that any commission of inquiry into the October 7 failures should be appointed not by the Supreme Court, as required by law, but by “someone everyone trusts” – meaning, the government. Others on the right, such as MK Amichai Eliyahu, have called for the High Court itself to be investigated, accusing it of “tying the army’s hands.”

In this context, the trial no longer matters as a constraint; it serves as a symbol. The judiciary itself has become the target, not the venue, of accountability. The outcome of this struggle will determine not only Netanyahu’s personal fate but the balance of power between Israel’s elected government and its independent institutions.

Israel’s Pause

Two years after October 7, Israel is not at peace but at a pause. The guns are mostly silent, though ceasefire violations abound. And Israel sounds with unfinished business – a fragile coalition, an impending draft crisis, and a society still reckoning with postwar trauma. The coming election will determine not only the future of Israeli leadership but also whether accountability, pluralism, and restraint can regain footing after years of fear and fragmentation. Meanwhile, the country sorely lacks a meaningful political vision, and its very identity is at stake.